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Eclair et brûlure 
Mort en sourire 
Sous rire mort 
Rire en d´lire éclaté 
Raison sans Etat 
Etat de derision 
Illuminations 
Souvenirs et rêves 
confondus dans la flame 





Beau ou pas 
Je m’en fous 
J’aime mes poux  
Et si parfois j’ai l’air fou 
 
SHUBBAH 




A MBOMBA EEH 





Rythme de vie 
CHOSE 
J’OSE 
Mon marabout luis sait où je vais 
J’ai mangé le coer du hibou 
De lui j’ai tous les atouts 
Je suis prêt à tout 
Jusqu’au bout de mes bouts 
 
SCHUBBAH 
JE SUIS SCHUBBAH 
 
Je porte des boubous 
J’ai dans les yeux des bijoux 
Ma case est en bamboo 
Mes meubles en bois d’acajou 
Pas de sou 
Pas de dessus 
Pas de dessous 
Pas de souci 




Je mange du fou-fou 
Ma houe est dans la boue 
La boue 
Je l’ai jusqu’au cou 
Mais coucou 




Mon frère est Zoulou 
Mes femmes sont Papoues 
Pas de tabou 
De toutes je suis l’èpoux 
J’ASSURE 
Et quand je fais bisou 
Aux Zazoux 
Pas de jaloux 
C’est nous nous 
 
SCHUBBAH 
JE SUIS SCHUBBAH 
 









La nuit je fais jou-jou 
Avec les NJU NJU 
Cosmique 
Cause mixte 
Je conjugue le vérité 
En parlant de nous 
Aimer double 






You-you et tremolo à tue-tête 
Pour accueillir le jour toujours nouveau 
En depart 
Pars avec les parts 
 
A l’instant 
Je fais l’amour avec l’air 
Pour me confondre au rythme du soufflé 
Et vivre dans la force du temps 
 
SCHUBBAH 
JE SUIS SCHUBBAH 
 
You-you et tremolo à tue-tête 
De la tête  
Retour jusqu’au pied de la racine 
Je pense donc je suis 
Je danse donc je swing 
TRANCE 
Je suis IN 
Je suis gai 




Je suis reggae dans la communion 
de mon corps et de l’autre 
SOUL POWER 
Super 
Je suis saoul 







JE SUIS SCHUBBAH 
 
Blasé 
Bluesé par la raison du rien 
L’absurde du vide 
Le Bonheur qui se plaint 
Je suis FUNKY 
Ils font quoi 
Je suis funk 
Rock 
Aussi dur que la peur 
Eh pa SALSA 
KWASSA-KWASSA 
SA MAKOSSA 
Si si ASSIKO 
Un coup BIKOUTSI 
Quoi? 
Assez jazzé 
Je fonce je défence 
WOOGIE 
Bougie 
Et cette flame qi m’active le corps 
 
SCHUBBAH 
JE SUIS SCHUBBAH 
 
Je suis homme 
Je suis âme 
Je suis faune 
Je suis flamme 
 
SCHUBBAH 
Sur la terre qui m’ensemence 
Et que je piétine 
 
SCHUBBAH 
Sur le flanc nu de la femme 
Qui traverse le rêve 
 
SCHUBBAH 
Sur le temps qui passé  
Et mon corps qui pisse 





from “orchestration verbale pour un hymne à la vie” 
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This dissertation examines the interaction between music, politics and the 
Cameroonian media in the production and role of the popular music called 
bikutsi.  In the context of Cameroonian music, bikutsi had long been associated 
solely with the Beti region surrounding the capital of Yaoundé, and as such 
considered a marginal music patronized by the “villageois.”  Nevertheless, after 
Paul Biya assumed the presidency of Cameroon in 1982, and his subsequent 
inauguration of the Office de Télévision Nationale du Cameroun (Cameroon 
Radio and Television-CRTV) in 1985, bikutsi acquired the importance of a 
national music, and indeed a minor global phenomenon.   
Using the politico-economic backdrop of capital at the millennium, I show 
how the ethos of neoliberalism has helped turn African nation-states such as 
Cameroon into what has been called “regimes of unreality,” divorced from 
economic control, dependent on a multitude of development projects in the 
 xiii 
manner of contemporary cargo cults, and left with only the semblance of 
fetishism with which to connect to its people. In recent years, however, the 
process of media liberalization has taken away the state media’s ability to enact 
that message, and thus the regime’s power of persuasion. Instead the populace is 
left with a new type of cargo, in the form of sounds and imagery to go along with 
the narrative of global consumer culture.  
This has left an opportunity for those with the skill and imagination to 
make use of the new information, allowing artists, musicians and writers to be the 
next members of a new civil society. This is what I refer to as the emancipatory 
promise of the new cargo cult, where instead of capital accumulation there is only 
ephemera—signs, sounds and images that multiply and intensify in unpredictable 
and sometimes dangerous ways. I use the national lens of bikutsi to analyze these 
dynamics on a local and global level, in the city, the quartier and the village. 
Ultimately, understanding the media process and cargo has the ability to allow 
individuals to overcome the narrow vision of political machinery, and act as 
another potential cog in the civil society of meaningful relationships.  
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Without it you can’t make soup… 
 
 One night early in my fieldwork, in a cabaret in Yaoundé, I was struck by 
a performer working his way through the crowd in between the music sets. In his 
hands were marionette strings with which he controlled a three-foot high puppet 
dressed as a typical Cameroonian comic buffoon in oversized colorful clothes, 
long tie and blackface. The marionette walked in front of the manipulator, greeted 
patrons, danced bikutsi to the recorded music and finally stopped in front of me. It 
held up its hands and made as if to shrug its shoulders—really a quite remarkable 
performance. I turned to my friend and asked why the puppet had stopped. “He’s 
waiting for gombo.”  
 Gombo, like the Cajun stew, is a common and popular soup made 
throughout Cameroon. Its main ingredient is okra, which contributes to its rather 
slippery texture, and is eaten with corn fufu (pounded starch) called couscous. 
However, if you hear the word ten times, only one of them perhaps is someone 
referring to the food.  
 2 
 It is also money, often illicit, and I was to find in the coming months that 
giving and receiving gombo in the form of bribery or tip drove much of the 
dynamic in Cameroonian life. Just to make a living as a professional musician, for 
instance, meant traveling from cabaret to cabaret on any given night, playing a set 
here and a set there in order to “make gombo.” Buskers would often wander in 
and out of restaurants playing popular guitar songs, or show up at the bus station 
during arrivals and departures in order to make a little gombo.  
 
 
Figure 1: Gombo with couscous 
  
Making gombo is a phenomenon far beyond tips, however. It is a tacitly 
sanctioned way to augment income at every level of society and government. For 
example, I was stopped on the street on many occasions by a traffic police who 
demanded papers and finally, “Ou est mon gombo?” In 2005, the Cameroonian 
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Ambassador to the United States, H.E. Mendouga, was brought under charges of 
embezzling 4.6 million dollars earmarked for embassy renovations. One response 
to the investigation team read, “Imagine the gumbo! Lots and lots of it. I tell you 
my brother, leave this man alone. He is filthy rich. He can damage you. His 
brother is [President] Biya. They chop together” (Adams 2005). 
 However, the most common public reference to the economics of gombo 
revolves around the practice of journalism, both in print and broadcast. It has long 
been assumed that journalists take bribes of gombo to praise state officials, cover 
up their crimes, and denounce their enemies. Pro-government journalists take 
bribes to praise the regime while pro-opposition journalists take bribes to 
denounce the regime. This is one of the means of ensuring state control of the 
media as well as dissemination of the party line.  
 Part of this issue is the constant lack of economic stability in the media 
sector, which makes gathering and producing the news difficult. Additionally, the 
tenuous nature of job security among journalists has affected objectivity and 
professionalism, and makes for less than credible news. These unethical practices 
are commonly known as le journalisme de gombo, which refers to the various 
forms of kickbacks, freebies, and rewards solicited by journalists and provided by 
various news actors to journalists (Nyamnjoh 2005: 158). One hears as well of 
mon gombo personnel (news sources) and interviews recorded on the 
gombophone.  
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 Considering demand for self-regulation in an absence of mechanisms for 
enforcing standards or accountability, Ndangam sees the journalists’ challenge as 
an “attempt to combine individual and collective notions of personhood with 
responsibilities to society and the journalism profession, in an environment of 
economic hardship and rampant corruption” (Ndamgan 2006). However, even if 
we acknowledge the creative means of making gombo for themselves, it is often a 
point of pride for some journalists to assert their non-reliance on the notorious 
brown envelopes.  
 Pius Njawe, publisher of Le Messager and often cited as the most staunch 
advocate for press freedom in Cameroon (arrested more than 100 times, jailed on 
three occasions) has stated in interview that in a context of constant harassment, 
journalists doing their job properly above all means “avoiding ‘gumbo 
journalism’, a practice increasingly widespread in our profession, where people 
write what they are paid to write instead of giving real information and the truth. 
While journalists have the right to earn a decent living, even in emerging nations, 
honest journalists never need pockets in their shrouds…” (Njawe 2006).  
 Gombo journalism goes a long way toward explaining the popular reliance 
on radio trottoir, or sidewalk radio, which is the circulation of rumor and 
exaggeration meant to overcome the deficiency of real information. However, 
with the onset of private and seemingly less controllable or accountable media, 




The bikutsi is everywhere... 
 
That was the very first statement I heard in response to my project, and 
perhaps there is nothing quite so confidence inspiring, or terrifying, as knowing at 
least that your data exists, somewhere, Out There. And she was right; bikutsi 
informs every aspect of Cameroonian society, at every level. It is always a part of 
the conversation, the experience, or maybe lurking just below the surface. By its 
production, consumption and signification, bikutsi is a stake in the political, 
media and religious game, aside from the personal and lived experience.  
The phenomenon of bikutsi is not limited to the southern Cameroon Beti 
group from which it comes. Between the mid-80s and mid-90s, the song Essingan 
by the great bikutsi band Les Têtes Brulées became the unofficial anthem of the 
nation, crossing ethnic, linguistic and religious boundaries. Essingan is the largest 
tree in the rainforest, and among Beti folklore, a great man is often referred to as 
essingan for his stoutness and courage. “Back then, everyone was Beti,” I was 
told, over and again. Surely this song had more import and significance than 
Biya’s own personal national anthem to himself. 
Bikutsi links everything and everyone together, including the elite, the 
popular and the working class, all annexed to the state and intimately tied to local 
government machinery.  What this is embedded in and what it comes out of, and 
 6 
ultimately, how it all unravels at ground level are the questions that remain to be 
asked. 
Therefore this dissertation examines the interaction between music, 
politics and the Cameroonian media in the production and role of the popular 
music called bikutsi.  In the context of Cameroonian music, bikutsi had long been 
associated solely with the Beti region surrounding the capital of Yaoundé, and as 
such considered a marginal music patronized by the “villageois.”  Nevertheless, 
after Paul Biya assumed the presidency of Cameroon in 1982, and his subsequent 
inauguration of the Office de Télévision Nationale du Cameroun (Cameroon 
Radio and Television-CRTV) in 1985, bikutsi acquired the importance of a 
national music, and indeed a minor global phenomenon.   
Clearly, bikutsi could not have achieved this degree of prominence 
without the backing of President Biya, a Beti and great bikutsi fan, and contingent 
government support.  However, this does not take into account the currents in 
Cameroonian society that make bikutsi possible, and indeed link it to all levels of 
popular culture from working class to elite, in spite of it being intimately tied to 
local government machinery.  This work specifically analyzes how bikutsi fills in 
the gaps between local voices, politics and the media, and focuses on the different 
levels, aside from the musical, on which bikutsi plays.  In light of the failing 
government control of the mass media, this project is of critical importance, as 
music is a valuable means for examining the processes by which actors find the 
ability to craft a voice out of tight places. I follow the lead of noted Cameroonian 
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scholar Achille Mbembe, who calls for scholars of Africa to give as intelligible an 
account as possible of the political imagination and political, social and cultural 
reality in Africa today (Mbembe 2001). 
More specifically, I started with the three basic terms of music, politics, 
and media, which at the time seemed overly simplistic and painfully obvious. And 
yet, in a country such as Cameroon, which has enjoyed/suffered the relative 
stability of only 2 presidents since independence in 1960, it is impossible to 
extricate one term from the other. Each and every facet of public life, be it 
expressive culture, the governance by a euphemistically benign dictatorship (nee 
multiparty democracy), or the sounds and imagery that tie them together, helps 
maintain a Bourdieu-like sense of misrecognition for the government, 
concurrently playing a role in the tactics of those below who struggle to find 
effective means to act.   
Cameroon, like other developing countries, has been the recipient of 
numerous development projects. Whatever strings may have come attached, one 
can point around the city and countryside to the hospitals built by China, schools 
built by France, rainforest roads developed by Brazil, even the national television 
studio donated by Germany. And this has become an issue for local perception. 
One night the conversation at a local bar turned to the topic of largesse, and of 
government apathy, and an animated patron stood up and proclaimed, “Everyone 
here is waiting for the White to come and give him money, and build his house. 
Maybe they need the White to come and fuck his woman for him as well.”  
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And at the time, it occurred to me that this did indeed resemble the 
dynamic of goods that were expected to arrive from the mythical cargo ships of 
the South Pacific. Perhaps the ancestors were finally paying off. And perhaps not 
enough. For instance, I later discovered much of the recording equipment at the 
CRTV to be in a state of non-repair, which it turned out had been the case for 
years. When I asked why it hadn’t been repaired, a department head related a 
story of how the Germans (Siemens) had actually offered to come to Cameroon 
and repair the equipment. However a number of directors insisted on being flown 
to Germany for training on repair. And an extended holiday. The offer was closed, 
and the equipment remains inactive.   
Stepping backward and putting this into a political perspective gives the 
context for what eventually becomes my imagining of a new cargo cult for the 
twenty-first century. Capital at the end of the millennium, or what the Comaroffs 
calls “messianic capital” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 2), has helped turn 
African nation-states such as Cameroon into what Mbembe refers to as “regimes 
of unreality” (Mbembe 2001), portrayed as a gospel of salvation, capable of 
wholly transforming the marginalized and disempowered. Here rational market 
capitalism finally inhabits the last uncharted bastion of time/space, or in our case, 
the equivalents of audio and visual, where the nation/state, and therefore 
government are forcibly distanced from and real sense of capital accumulation. 
And this process necessarily has to do with the increasing relevance of 
consumption, the shaping of selfhood, society and identity. As well, the nature of 
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social class under such political and economic conditions place a growing stress 
on gender and race as indices of identity. Thus divorced from economic control, 
the only connection left to the people for the sham state is the rule by force.  
 Liberal democracy and the version of development it inspires promises 
political, economic and cultural enrichment for all. But in reality a hidden hand of 
capital--the West--determines who among the many shall be provided for. And 
Nyamnjoh notes that its rhetoric of opening up, and of abundance, is squarely 
contradicted by the reality of closures and of want for most of its disciples. The 
hidden hand of global capital and its concerns, for example, through the IMF, 
World Bank and national interests of Western partners, make it possible "for 
autocracy to pay lip service to democracy and development in exchange for 
guaranteeing the political stability needed by investors to venture into the 
periphery. In exchange for having weak foreign relations, autocratic regimes like 
Cameroon's are afforded the ability and protection to flex their muscles within 
their own countries, in a perplexing and mystical manner" (Nyamnjoh 2001: 35) 
The crux of this argument is the shift in the nature of capitalism. The 
workplace is no longer the primary site of creation of value, the factory disappears 
and labor is moved elsewhere. The turn is to the market and speculation, and to 
generating wealth by less tangible means such as services, communication and the 
flow of finance. Yet as the Comoroffs have pointed out, there is no such thing as 
capitalism sans production. In experiential terms, especially in the developing 
world, the core of messianic capital seems to include but to marginalize, produce 
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desire and expectation yet decrease the certainty of work or security. How these 
processes play out have much to do with current crises of nostalgia for repressive 
regimes, the increasing importance of identity and inclusion, and the fear, 
especially in Africa, of the preternatural production of wealth.  
 Neo liberalism aspires in its ideology and practice to intensify the 
abstraction inherent in capitalism itself, to separate labor power from its human 
context and to replace society with the market. "In the magicality of the state in 
the age of millennial capital, ritual excess stand as alibis for realpolitik—which 
recedes ever farther as its surfaces are visible primarily through the glassy essence 
of television, the tidal swirl of radio waves, the fine print of the press" (Comaroff 






Figure 2: Immeuble de la Mort, Biya’s downtown centerpiece, unfinished 
for twenty years  
 
 
And for the last few decades, at least as far as Cameroon and the CRTV is 
concerned, the state owned and controlled media was obliged to play along, 
relaying the fetish of the state in all its glory. But the advent of satellite cable, the 
Internet, increased mobility and global pressure has eroded those same safe 
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networks. In recent years the media infrastructure has begun to overflow, with 
pirate and private radio, independent television under control from foreign 
countries, and all with a distinct lack of government flavor. The flood of new 
sounds and images, the actual soundtrack and narrative of global consumer 
culture, has left an enormous opportunity for those with the skill and imagination 
to make use of the new information. Artists, musicians and writers have become 
media experts as McLuhan predicted, best equipped to navigate the morass of 
consumer ecstasy.  
 McLuhan’s fundamental premise is that media is a technological 
simulation of consciousness, an extension of our central nervous system.  It 
collapses time and space, and through it, all technologies can be translated into 
information systems.  Both media and technology are fraught with dangers, 
mainly centered around the concept of misrecognition. According to McLuhan, 
artists are able to apprehend messages of cultural and technological change before 
the impact occurs.  The artist is a “man of integral awareness,” and can grasp 
implications of his actions and of new knowledge in his own time.  Thus, if one 
could read the so called "signs of the times" in contemporary art, one would have 
the information on how to re-arrange one’s psyche in order to anticipate the next 
blow from our own extended faculties.   
 What does this mean in terms of the contemporary cargo cult? Everyone is 
waiting for the things that could allow them to become players on the world stage. 
Cargo is no longer the goods coming off planes, but in media images that make up 
 13 
the local imaginary. Today the youth belong to Coupé Décalé, the reigning 
pop/dance style since the early part of the decade. Though associated with Cote 
d'Ivoire, the music actually originated amongst Ivorian immigrants in Paris. It's a 
mostly laptop generated sound, heavy with Congolese rhythm samples, thick bass 
and minimal guitar and keyboard arrangements. Although repetitive and 
uninteresting on a musical level, it offers the rapper/dj an opportunity to freestyle 
about the good life, extolling the virtues of bonne ambience. Appropriately, 
videos are always shot in extravagant venues, or surrounded by expensive props 
such as a Ferrari or Lamborghini, and the musicians are always expensively 
dressed, sporting designer sunglasses and extra long cigars. It is extravagant 
excess at its best. Literally, coupé décalé means to cut and re-arrange, referring to 
the style of production involved. However, in local slang, coupé is to cheat, while 
décalé is to run, thus a sense of protest or paean to those who can succeed by guile 
or rather "stick it to the man" so to speak.  
Borrowing from the previous worldbeat model of reggae as default global 
soundtrack, we find the trope of emancipation is alive and well, but it has moved 
from the political/religious to the sphere of capital and excess, from the spiritual 
realm to the one of pure exchange value. Whereas reggae once promised African 
youth the redemption of Rastafarianism, itself a failed political movement turned 
religion, Coupé Décalé fuses the deliverance of reggae through hip-hop’s modern 
vehicle of excess and conspicuous consumption. Emancipation by capital gain. 
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And this is what I will call the emancipatory promise of the new cargo 
cult, where instead of capital accumulation there is only ephemera—signs, sounds 
and images--and they multiply and intensify in unpredictable and sometimes 
dangerous ways. I use the national lens of bikutsi to analyze these dynamics on a 
local and global level, in the city, the quartier and the village. Ultimately, 
understanding the media process and cargo has the ability to allow individuals to 
overcome the narrow vision of political machinery, as well as act as another 
potential cog in civil society.  
 
African and Cameroonian Scholarship 
 
Existing scholarship on popular music, or music in general in Cameroon is 
sparse. There is the classic by Francis Bebey entitled African Music, A People's 
Art (Bebey 1969). While an ambitious project for the time, and a wonderful 
collection of photographs and recordings from a Cameroonian scholar, the book is 
too far-reaching and in some cases actually in error. In light of current 
scholarship, we have to consider it somewhat out of date. Other smaller works on 
specific topics exist: the excellent and highly empirical Ngumu book on mendzan, 
though woefully short (Ngumu 1976), a small biography on singer Anne Marie 
Nzié (Tagne 1990), and more recently another small and highly opinionated work 
on bikutsi (Noah 2002).  
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Most recent is Ignatowski's Journey of Song: Public Life and Morality in 
Cameroon, which gives a well-written perspective from a former Peace Corp 
worker who travels back to her village in the far north of Cameroon to study the 
composition and performance of annual Tupuri song and dance celebrations 
(Ignatowski 2006). Currently, there is research being done in the grassfields area 
of Cameroon, comprising the mostly Anglophone area and Bamiléke homelands. 
A forthcoming work by SIL member and UCLA graduate Brian Schragg will 
isolate malleable infrastructures of Bamiléke traditional song and document the 
re-composition of texts that follow closer to Christian themes. 
 None of this work, however, engages on a popular level, with the political 
realm or the media, and not in an empirical and qualitative manner. In fact, very 
few qualitative ethnographies have been written on the expressive culture of 
Central Africa in the past decade, and certainly none situated in Cameroon that 
have understood the production of culture as irrevocably embedded in the 
political and media situation from which they come, and in which they circulate.  
 In other Africanist ethnomusicology, Erlmann's Nightsong points toward 
utilizing new theoretical models in order to study the connections between music, 
performance, power, and resistance (Erlmann 1996). As well, Kisliuk works to 
deconstruct the boundaries between ethnographic subject and object through an 
exploration of the BaAka people of Central African Republic. Her style of 
performance ethnography refers not only to the ethnography of performance but 
also emphasizes the performative nature of fieldwork (Kisliuk 2001). In Jùjú, 
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Waterman explores the invocation of the traditional in an urban context, and 
illustrates how new meanings are assigned in contemporary social space. 
Ultimately by deconstructing monolithic notions of African ethnic purity, and the 
stability of tradition, Waterman shows human agency in musical production and 
the reality of the lived experience of postcolonial Africa (Waterman 1990). In 
Sound of Africa! Meintjes illustrates how the production of ethnicity is a process 
that actors undergo with particular political and social agendas in mind. She 
shows that the production of “Zuluness” is not limited to sounds and images, but 
how these sounds and images circulate in political spheres (Meintjes 2003). 
Finally, Turino adds to the literature of Zimbabwe by describing music, dance and 
theatre as raw material for a cultural production immersed in a capitalist economy 
(Turino 2000).  
 Perhaps the only current musical monograph in Francophone Africa to 
currently address these issues is Bob White's Rumba Rules (White 2008). White 
situates one of the most popular and pervasive musical genres in Africa firmly in 
the arc of Mobutu Sese Seko's political regime, and explores the mobility of 
musicians and the successes and failures of rumba and soukous in the political 
economy of Mobutu's cultural policy. White is engaging and one gets the sense of 
the import of his theoretical applications for other works in other countries. 
However, there is more to be said for the media, the single most important tool in 
a political sphere that relied wholly on the power of the state fetish.  
 17 
 My work therefore, is engaged with a number of Central African scholars 
whose work addresses these very issues. Francis Beng Nyamnjoh has written 
extensively on the Cameroonian media and political sphere since 1989. His work 
casts a broad net over issues of democratization and political economy, tribalism 
and witchcraft, music and politics, and issues of exclusion and belonging 
(Nyamnjoh 2005, 2003, 2002, 2001, 1996, 1989). As well, Cameroonian historian 
Achille Mbembe paints a subtle picture of the postcolony under Cameroonian 
rule. Indeed it is impossible to think of the country with his notions of power, 
vulgarity and commandement to explain the behavior of the state, the masses and 
there complicity (Mbembe 2001, 1996). Finally, my work is indebted to Jean-
François Bayart for his ability to make large conceptual processes meaningful, 






The first term in my triptych of understanding this problem is the political, 
and what that really means here is the ethos of millennial capitalism and the 
discourses, intricacies and contradictions inherent in the culture of neoliberalism 
that it contains. Comaroff and Comaroff refer to the promise of millennial capital 
as having the capacity to wholly transform the universe of the marginalized and 
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disempowered. And yet they are careful to point out that because of 
decontextualization and the distantiation from place and its socioeconomic 
pressures, for the vast majority the millennial moment passed without visible 
enrichment.  
The general strategy (and hope) of millennial capital says that removing 
state distortions of markets should create the conditions for economic growth, 
while rapid privatization would yield a flood of new private capital investment. 
Unfortunately, it also intensifies the abstraction in inherent in capitalism itself by 
separating labor power from its human context, and by continuously replacing 
society with the market itself. And as Bourdieu has pointed out, this is nothing 
more than the implementation of a utopia—the utopia of neoliberalism—thus 
converted to a political problem. For him, neoliberalism favors severing the 
economy from social realities, thereby constructing and economic system 
conforming to its description in pure theory (Bourdieu 1998).  
How is this specifically important for Africa? James Ferguson has astutely 
noted that the ideology of neoliberalism has served to deconstruct the grand 
narratives of globalization, at least as far as Africa is concerned. Rather than the 
persuasive and totalizing urge of homogenization that is normally feared, global 
links in Africa connect in a selective, discontinuous and point-to-point fashion. 
Globalization has not brought consumer culture within reach of most Africans, 
nor the homogenization of lifestyle that normally encompasses. Rather, he says, 
“globalization has brought an increasingly acute awareness of the semiotic and 
 19 
material goods of the global rich, even as economic pauperization and the loss of 
faith in the promises of development have made the chances of actually attaining 
such goods seem more remote than ever.” (Ferguson 2000: 21).  
And that is the point. The idea that people assert global membership by 
other methods, often as he says, “through a brilliantly inventive bricolage of 
scraps and leftovers, is a fact more likely to be celebrated by the cultural analyst 
than by the “locals” themselves, who may see such practices more as signs of 
weakness than of strength.” And I admit, I am just as much to blame. In my first 
weeks in Douala, I was struck by the enormous public statue Nouvelle Liberté, a 
work by the notable sculptor Joseph Sumégné, and made entirely of garbage. I 
immediately noted to my associates that I would have to come back for a proper 
photo session, as this was going to be the cover of a future book. I was enthralled, 
and they were disgusted. “That’s nju nju (witchcraft), and terribly ugly. No one 









As it turns out, “Nouvelle Liberté” lies at the heart of multiple debates regarding 
public space and ownership, fetishism and the fear of witchcraft, and of what 
Nyamnjoh refers to as the “politics of belonging” (Nyamnjoh 2005). 
 Sumégné's work was commissioned in 1996 as an artistic and urban 
planning intervention by the Dutch NGO iStrike and a local arts council called 
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Doual’art, owned by Marilyn Douala Bell. Bell is better known as granddaughter 
to the famous King Rudolph Douala Manga Bell who was hanged, and thus 
martyred for organizing resistance forces against German colonialists in 1914. 
Marilyn Bell used privately secured funds to mount Sumégné’s work, but before 
it was finished, controversy halted its installation more than once. The figure 
stands about 40 feet high in the middle of the Deido roundabout, one of the most 
visible and high-traffic crossroads in Douala. And although public space in 
Cameroon is generally occupied space, the vendors and traffic police that once 
occupied the circle now stay clear, having chosen instead to set up shop on the 
opposite sides of the street.  
 In an interview, Sumégné offered the statue as a critique of New York’s 
Statue of Liberty. Instead of a torch shining for enlightenment and wisdom, 
Sumégné sees violence and destruction, and his Liberty holds up a globe as the 
object of that violence. Its leg is raised and the arms are bent in an attitude of 
exertion, for as he says, Liberty must be constantly maintained. However the 
results are ambiguous, since it might also be seen as a figure in dance, exhibiting 
a broad but disconcerting smile that seems to welcome drivers from downtown. 
The sculpture, like all of Sumégné’s works of “récupération,” is constructed 
entirely of discarded mechanical and electrical parts from cars or appliances, and 
strung together with wire and cable. It may evoke the humanity of the Statue of 
Liberty, but it also strikes one as robotic, and while it bears the resemblance of 
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traditional African sculpture writ large, it speaks as a futuristic version as well 
(Hanussek 2007). 
 What is interesting, however, is how locals of Deido react to it, beyond its 
so-called "rubbish aesthetic." Some people I met were unaware of the work's real 
name, but in fact everyone knew the reference "Nju-Nju du Rond Point." Not long 
after the sculpture was installed, the work was rumored to contain witchcraft, and 
locals avoided it while threatening both Doual'art and Sumégné.  
 Christian Hanussek's work on art in public spaces addresses the notion of 
fetishism and magic in machine aesthetics.  
The fragments of machines and electrical appliances, in place of the 
figure’s bones and organs, are laid bare without a protective skin. 
Produced on other continents and circulating globally, they represent a 
world that is out of reach for most Africans. They represent a threat which 
has the power to question one’s own culture and one’s own skills. Every 
récupération piece can therefore be regarded as a fetish, which takes in the 
foreign, fragmented objects, thereby taming and keeping them under 
control (Hanussek 2007). 
 
 That reading doesn't go far enough to explain the local fear of the statue, 
however, or address the struggle over control of public space this particular 
narrative of witchcraft contains.  I suggest Austen's definition of witchcraft as an 
alternative discourse to market rationality and modernity, and as a practice aimed 
against the powerful and wealthy (Austen 1993: 92). The idea that Sumégné, a 
Bamiléké operating in what had been historically a Sawa quartier and city, was 
infringing upon the space already being rapidly bought and populated by 
Bamiléké land developers goes further toward an explanation of nju-nju 
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allegations, and the rumor that the statue could clone itself during the night and 
appear at different places throughout Douala.  
 This then, also becomes a contestation between ethnic and public space as 
well, where Bamiléké now outnumber Sawa by a 3:1 ratio, and dominate business 
and increasingly political affairs. Returning then to the politics of belonging, 
Nyamnjoh contends that ethnicity and belonging remain active forces in African 
daily life. "As ethnic groups--local majorities or minorities--clamour for status, 
they are countered by an often aggressive reaffirmation of age-old exclusions 
informed by colonial registers of inequalities among the subjected (Nymanjoh 
2005: 233)". The rhetoric of free flows and dissolving boundaries, of 
neoliberalism and globalization as well, instead create an atmosphere of closures 
and exclusion, and a greater obsession with belonging, whether between local 
communities in the quartier, or nation-states in the globality.  
Ferguson also rightly claims the idea that deregulation and privatization 
would prove a panacea for African economic stagnation was a dangerous and 
destructive illusion, as Africa has suffered the lowest rates of economic growth 
ever recorded, along with increasing inequality and marginalization. What this 
says about Cameroon in particular lies in the way many African states have 
withdrawn from their national societies and obligations, leaving export production 
guarded and detached from their surrounding societies. And as Mbembe has 
noted, all that is left at that point is the fetish of the state. This ritual is enacted on 
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the public through visual imagery and discourse until a certain political 
consciousness is affected (Mbembe 2001: 103).  
The exercise of power in African states since independence--generalized 
for Mbembe under the term the 'postcolony'--has been marked by a liking for the 
ceremonial and by an exhibitionism that is the more remarkable considering how 
illusory the states' practical achievements. In the postcolongy, the commandement 
seeks to institutionalize itself, to achieve legitimization and hegemony in the form 
of a fetish, an object that aspires to be made sacred. The signs and symbols are 
officially invested with a surplus of meanings that are not negotiable and that one 
is officially forbidden to challenge. This brings us to the media as the most 






 "Ordinary Africans are determined to be part of the technological 
revolutions of the modern world, even if this means accessing the information 
superhighway on foot, horseback, bicycles, bush taxis and second-hand cars" 
(Nymanjoh 2005: 4). The overwhelming majority of mass communication media 
theory is based on data from the United States and Great Britain. Thus issues of 
power, the state, conflict, societal change, the economy, institutionalized racism 
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and ethnic insurgency, secrecy and surveillance have tended to be marginalized in 
the literature. However, as John Downing has pointed out, media and their 
cultural expressions are a pivotal dimension of the struggle for power that is 
muted but ever-present in dictatorial regimes (Downing 1996).   
 That struggle then develops between political movements and the 
authoritarian state. Alternative media then, give voice to these movements, and 
are central to understanding the movement process itself. And of course, in Africa 
as well as most places, it is essential to include all forms of media--graffiti, 
cartoon, theatre, religious observance, music--into the debate to form a more 
complete analysis.  
 The history and development of the media in Africa, and especially West 
Africa where the most research and literature exist, is tied as one might expect to 
the history of colonialism. It is said that the British press was designed by the 
British, for the British, and the same with the French.  
 Among the challenges inherent in the developing media of postcolonial 
Africa, Ugboajah points to the issue of indigenous programming and language use 
as central to local effectiveness, and highlights the importance of national policies 
to stimulate the development of local programming (Ugboajah 1985). The second 
challenge is the linkage between African broadcasters, editors and producers and 
the Western models they continue to follow, rather than finding formats 
appropriate to the cultural context of the region. Finally, there is the continued 
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problem central to government run media agencies of information diffusion, such 
as crisis news and the international wire service.  
 Most studies of media in Africa tend to do with democratization issues. 
Considering economic liberalization and political democratization, media has 
come to play a much greater role than ever since independence. However, the 
place of communication theory hasn't received a great amount of attention since 
the heyday of modernization thinking in the 50s and 60s.  
 Hyden and Leslie argue that privately owned media have been in the 
forefront of creating political space for other actors in the public arena and 
enhancing the extent to which public officials have to consider themselves 
accountable to the citizenry (Hyden, Leslie, Ogundimu 2002).  
 Their work media and democracy in Africa focuses on the same recurring 
themes, at least in the cultural realm: the extent to which the ongoing 
globalization is creating a cultural dependence on values that contradict those that 
may have guided African social and political relations to date, and the 
significance of informal media that are peculiar to the African societies because of 
the prevalence of an oral tradition and the relative weakness of formal institutions.  
 Nyamnjoh has probably written most extensively on the role of the media 
in Africa, using Cameroon specifically as his data model. Mostly examining the 
role played by the media in the democratization process of the 1990s, he contends 
that if civil society is crucial for democracy (and he thinks it is), then 
communication networks are even more so. He furthers Ugboajah's argument that 
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culturally, the media are victims of an imposed hierarchy of national and world 
cultural, while at the same time excluding African world views and cultural 
values that do not guarantee profitability (Nyamnjoh 2005: 2). The consequence is 
an idea of democracy not informed by popular articulations of personhood and 
agency in Africa, and media whose professional values are not in tune with the 
expectations of those they purport to serve.  
 Nyamnjoh has a special attraction to the possibilities of the Internet, 
however, considering the rapid pace of expansion, and the fact that every African 
country currently has access. "Even as part of the global grip of the commercial 
media moguls, which Africa is bound to become eventually, the Internet could 
serve as a formidable tool for consumer mobilization towards exacting greater 
accountability and cultural relevance for media products targeting African 
audiences in the continent and the diaspora" (Nyamnjoh 2005: 15).  
 
Media in Cameroon 
 
In Cameroon, the problem with enacting the state fetish is maintaining 
control of the stage. Until recently this hadn’t been an issue. Since Independence, 
government declarations have often stressed the importance of the media in the 
attainment of cultural, economic and political development objectives.  It has, as 
well, called upon the media to play a leading role in disseminating information 
 28 
and mobilizing Cameroonians toward self-reliance, autonomy and independence 
in economic, cultural and political matters. 
And yet, it remains the only African country to practice legal pre-
publication censorship of the press.  Article 14 (which replaces other laws equally 
rigorous) of the “Freedom of Mass Communication” bill, enacted in December of 
1990 requires newspapers to submit their copy to the Senior Divisional Officer 
before they can be printed.  As well, Article 17 allows the same officer to seize 
any publication deemed inappropriate, while giving the Minister of Territorial 
Administration the right to ban the publication altogether (Maja-Pearce 1996: 52).   
Public announcements are periodically made to the contrary, possibly to 
assuage foreign aid organizations.  In September of 1994, the Minister of 
Communications, Augustin Kontchou Kouomengi, declared that “government 
censorship no longer deserves a place in our beloved, beautiful country” (1996: 
53).  Meanwhile, editors, publishers, and vendors are subjected to countless 
documented incidents of harassment, arrest, seizure and death threats.  In my own 
experience, I witnessed the riots that resulted in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in 
1999 when the publisher and editor of a leading independent weekly, which had 
recently criticized the president’s brother for killing his chauffeur, died when his 
Range Rover mysteriously blew up on the outskirts of town.  The papers reported 
it as an accident, which caused an outrage among the disbelieving public.   
Cameroon’s politics, its media and music are inextricably tied together. 
Since gaining independence in 1960, Cameroon has known only two presidents.  
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Ahmadu Ahidjo created the first constitution in 1961, and established a highly 
centralized political system in which all power resided in the presidency 
(DeLancey 1990: 51).  His tenure was marked by suppression of human rights, 
and repression was the rule.  Freedom of speech, the radio and the press was 
severely curtailed by censorship laws on the books since 1966, and today 
Cameroon remains the only country on the African continent that practices pre-
publication censorship of the press.   
Paul Biya, a Beti from the Yaoundé region, overthrew Ahidjo in 1982, and 
while state centralization and oppression have only increased, Biya can be noted 
for having inaugurated the Office de Télévision Nationale du Cameroun 
(Cameroon Radio Television-CRTV) in 1985.  Under both internal and external 
pressure, Biya officially repealed the censorship laws in 1996, but they are still 
enforced by measures of intimidation, arrests, detention, seizure and fines (Maja-
Pearce 1996).  
Because of this stringent self-censorship in addition to lack of advertising 
revenue and skilled manpower have forced the independent press to produce 
sporadic weeklies and bi-monthlies, which often concentrate on sports and crime 
news (Jong-Ebot 1989). In fact, of the more than 500 newspapers on legal record, 
only the government-sponsored “Cameroun Tribune” publishes daily.  
Additionally, government-owned radio operates all thirteen stations, and the state 
remains a de facto monopoly of the audio-visual sector. 
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According to Article 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, 
CRTV covers about 80% of the country, yet even after formally abolishing its 
broadcast monopoly, the government has yet to implement regulations for the 
licensing of private stations (Article 19 1999).  Thus, radio and television 
broadcasting continues to be a virtual monopoly of the state, and freedom of 
expression largely a sham.  Newspapers can be banned or seized, and there 
continues an ongoing campaign of criminal prosecution against journalists.   
It is no surprise, then, that Cameroonians rely heavily on international 
broadcasters such as the BBC and Voice of America, along with Western 
publications for their information of the world and Cameroon itself.  Francis 
Nyamnjoh has remarked that Cameroonians are “shaped far more by foreign 
publications than by the local press,” and that these publications reflected a social, 
economic and cultural reality that is in no way Cameroonian (Nyamnjoh 1990: 










Cameroon’s “golden age” of freedom of expression probably occurred in 
the mid-fifties as increasing pressure from pro-independence groups forced 
France towards concessions, resulting in the Loi Cadre  of 1956, and a plethora of 
news titles, each supporting a newly formed political party and each lasting about 
as long as that party.  By 1959, there were 91 political groups and 71 publications 
(all in French).  Before independence, there existed no British-supervised or 
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English language press, the British Cameroons making due with coverage from 
Nigeria.  Despite their late start, however, British Cameroon inherited a free press 
tradition from the British-influenced Nigeria.  According to Nyamnjoh, English 
papers (Times, Champion, Observer, Mirror, Post) had more in common with the 
“freer spirit of the Nigerian Press (modeled after the Anglo-Saxon tradition) than 
with the heavily censored French Cameroon alternative (modeled after the French 
or Latin Tradition)” (Nyamnjoh 1990: 59). 
After independence in January of 1960, President Ahidjo not only retained 
the spirit of repression established by the French, but backed by a French 
government eager to keep a moderate in power (in order to avoid another radical 
“total liberation a la Sekou Toure”), increased the severity of censorship 
effectively stifling the opposing UPC party and all those with a desire for greater 
democratic pluralism and participation.  Soon after Ahidjo took office, there 




France began broadcasting with one transmitter from Douala in 1941, 
mainly to assist Free French military efforts.  Until 1953 Radio Douala was 
capable of only 2-300 watts and available for broadcasting less than an hour a 
day. That was to remain Cameroon’s only radio station until 1955 when a second 
transmitter was installed at Yaoundé.  According to Nyamnjoh, French radio 
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supported the French policy of exporting language and culture at the expense of 
local interests, perhaps in part a response to fears of being overtaken in 
expansionist roles set by others like Great Britain.  But while the BBC worked to 
broadcast in major African languages, the RFI continued only in French, with the 
conviction that language and culture go hand in hand. 
In 1955 radio equipment was upgraded and power increased.  Also, the 
Studio Ecole was founded in Paris to train African technicians, journalists and 
animators.  By 1956, and the Loi Cadre, which granted limited autonomy to 
colonial territories, all station management was transferred to the French Overseas 
Radio Broadcasting Company (La Société de Radio-diffusion d’Outre-Mer), 
which was in charge of construction, equipment and administration of all overseas 
stations.  In 1973, three more stations were added to Faroua, Yaoundé and Buea. 
Though these measures were purportedly taken to organize and train 
communities in their own running of local stations, Francophone Africa is still 
largely dependent on programs made and broadcast from Paris, in French, about 
France and French culture.  Since the advent of television in Cameroon, the 
French have taken equivalent steps to ensure that American television programs 





In 1962, Cameroon was one of sixteen countries with plans to introduce 
television in the near future. Then President Ahidjo had the foresight to envision 
the new media as a tool that would be employed to help solve the problems of 
development that faced Cameroon.  As he stated in 1963,  
 
“The setting up of a TV network does not automatically mean that rich 
programmes would be broadcast.  In this area, it is necessary to anticipate 
and to draw up beforehand, an elaborate plan and a stock of educative and 
entertainment programmes with the indispensable help of cinematographic 
techniques…with the aim of adapting…our future TV broadcasts to the 
real needs of our audience, by entertaining them with the greatest number 
possible of programmes that are truly Cameroonian and African, and, in 
every way, accessible to the nature and taste of the majority of viewers” 
(Nyamnjoh 1989: 36). 
 
 
Ahidjo took the view that his country should produce its own programs, and that 
these programs should reflect the Cameroonian way of life.  It would seem that, 
armed with the results of countless feasibility studies, and blessed with media and 
cultural experts such as writer, composer and musician Francis Bebey, all that was 
missing, in Nyamnjoh’s words, “was someone to shout ‘Open Sesame,’ and the 
competent staff, together with the rich educative Cameroonian and African 
programs would appear.   
Unfortunately, Ahidjo’s government completely neglected to prepare for 
TV by training the technical personal and producers who supposedly were to 
conceive programs of socio-cultural relevance.  Furthermore, he did nothing to 
encourage film production.  Cameroon was to wait another twenty-three years for 
 35 
television, which was eventually inaugurated without proper equipment, 
programs, or personnel.   
Under President Biya, CTV first broadcast from the city of Bamenda on 
20 March, 1985, from a mobile reporting van, for lack of equipment.  Its first 
program coincided with the Fourth Ordinary Congress of the Cameroon National 
Union, marking the birth of the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement 
(CPDM).  However auspicious was its inauguration, further broadcasts were 
tentative, and included Presidential activities, the visit of Pope John-Paul II and 
the African Nations Cup.  In December of 1985, CTV upped its broadcasts to 
twice weekly, and Siemens donated new equipment to the National Theatre in 
Yaoundé.  A year later they were able to operate four times a week.   
Among the biggest problems faced in the opening years was the lack of 
trained personnel, some of which were on loan from Cameroon Radio.  Of course, 
sensing the opportunities of an open media, sympathetic countries offered to train 
as many Cameroonians as needed.  However, Biya would not allow this, fearing 
the return of technicians steeped in Western media culture, values and practices.  
Be that as it may, after only two full years in operation, CTV was responsible for 
only ten percent of its own programming, the balance coming from France, 
Britain and the United States, thus virtually invalidating the 23-year precautions 





Considering the difficulty in regulating pirate radio, the absence of formal 
procedures for which independent media can apply for private broadcasting 
licenses has been particularly effective at keeping Cameroon’s airwaves free of 
non-government-sanctioned programming.  It was not until 1997 that a loophole 
allowing “community” stations, as opposed to “private” stations, access to the air 
prompted a Canadian-funded project to inaugurate five rural stations in remote 
areas of the country in which CRTV did not reach. 
Perhaps admitting that the government allows community radio despite 
governing licenses is an overstatement.  Each radio station, one planned for Oku 
in the Northwest, Mamfe in the Southwest, Foutouni in the West, Lolodorf in the 
South and Dana in the Far North, is capable of five kilowatts each, barely enough 
power to reach the sparsely populated areas they are aiming for.  And while the 
sponsors’ hopes are for a quality forum independent of CRTV, the specific 
government agenda states the radio stations’ purpose is not news, but rather “to 
allow the expression of the voice of rural communities as a means of 
communication…to promote their greater welfare; to support and underpin socio-
economic development initiatives and activities at a local level; and to improve 
the standing of traditional knowledge” (Article 19 1997: 14). 
Recently however, broadcasters have given up waiting for licenses. The 
obligatory pre-press screen for objectionable news content has subsided. And the 
first independent television stations began broadcasting during my fieldwork 
 37 
tenure. Partly due to government apathy, partly due to ease of digital 
communication, and partly due to the tireless efforts of information freedom 
fighters such as Messager/Freedom FM’s Pius Njawe, the major newspapers aside 
from the pro-government Tribune include Mutations, La Nouvelle Expression and 
Le Messager, each publishing daily and boasting between 10,000 and 17,000 in 
readership. Private electronic media, notably radio, now includes Magic FM, 
Radio Reine (Catholic), Radio Venus, Radio Télévision Lumière, Sky FM and 
Radio Siantou in Yaoundé alone, with a handful of others in Douala and other 
major regional cities. Finally, and most importantly, there were two fledgling 
television stations in Douala and one in Yaoundé. The largest concern, STV-Dla 
stressed urban culture and youth empowerment movements, and had the financial 






 It is always said that the name bikutsi comes from the Ewondo words 
"kut" and "si." The verb kut means to fight or slap. Bi makes it a plural form. Si 
refers to the ground or earth. Therefore, literally, bikutsi is to stamp the ground, 
repetitively. From the Ministry of Culture Guide to Dances from Cameroon, 
Stanislas Awona writes this:  
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The term Bikutsi has an early material origin: just in the night with the 
clear moon, the women were reuniting to sing, dance, and share their ideas 
according to a language known by them only, they delivered the frenetic 
dances in rhythms rudely stamped to the ground with their feet: from 
where the name “Bikutsi” (literally “dance stamping-ground”) gave not 
only to their wriggling about, but also to all that was said of the ones 
happily playing about (Awona 1971: 87).  
 
 
Jean Maurice Noah and others have written about the nature of bikutsi being born 
of a phallocratic society, one that relegated women an extremely marginal status. 
According to Noah, Beti women were forced to create a space in which to have a 
voice, "a vengeance consciously exercised by the women against the men" (Noah 
2002: 25). And Beti historian Laburthe-Tolra has added that the development of 
bikutsi has much to say about the social organization of Beti society, where men 
monopolize speech (Laburthe-Tolra 1981).  
Our earliest knowledge of bikutsi marks it as an unaccompanied women’s 
song form in the Beti villages of central and south Cameroon.  It served the 
women’s private spaces, and the lyrics gave voice to the frustrations and 
criticisms, as well as the hopes and advice that could be passed from generation to 
next (Mbala 1985, Mbia 1992, Ngumu 1976, Menguele 1979, Ghonda 1988).   
It is said that good bikutsi lyrics are smart, picturesque, paradoxical, 
oblique and suggestive.  They are marked by uses of imagery, poetry, and what is 
called the “hidden style,” as it is often possible to hide ideas or references in 
Ewondo linguistic codes.  It is the musical genre of subversion, feminine 
dissidence, and has always served a critical and tribunal function (Ndjana 1999). 
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The development of bikutsi involves the addition of various 
instrumentation by male musicians, including the nkul drum, a hollowed log 
capable of one interval, the plucked lyre called mvet that is more often used to 
accompany histories and poetry, and most importantly, the mendzan xylophone, 
for which bikutsi is most known today.  
 
Figure 5: The mvet, the most emblematic instrument of Cameroon 
 
Mendzan are portable, gourd-resonated xylophones, with a built-in rail 
that enables the instrument to be held away from the body of the player who plays 
while walking, pointing to its processional nature.  Mendzan in the Beti region are 
characteristically played in four member ensembles, one lead (omvek), two 
 40 
accompaniment (akuda-omv∂k and nyia-mendzan), and bass (endum) (Nugumu 
1976: 31-4).  These are often accompanied by drums and rattles.   
Tuning of the traditional mendzan has been detailed in the work of 
Cameroonian priest, composer and musicologist Pie-Claude Ngumu, who led the 
group La Maîtrise des Chanteurs à la Croix D’ebène.  Ngumu writes that mendzan 
tuning reflects the idea of a hierarchical order of tones corresponding with the 
family social pattern.  Tuning the ten-note omv∂k begins at the center of its 
extended range, or head of the family, and proceeds stepwise in descending order 
of pitches 1 through 6 (6 being the lowest note).  Upper octaves are then found for 
the lowest three pitches, the wives of male voices 6,5 and 4.  A seventh note, 
esandi (bad luck), is placed between 1 and 6, completing near equiheptatonic tone 
system (Ngumu 1976: 35-7).  The simultaneously struck harmonic basis of this 
music is mostly thirds and octaves, the thirds being “neutral” at approximately 
320-370 cents.  According to Ngumu, though, intervals are not fixed and 
musicians of each ethnic group adjusts the sounds of the instruments according to 
the specific necessities of their traditional and contemporary music (Ngumu 1976: 




Figure 6: Mendzan tuning pattern. 
 
Mendzan, and thus bikutsi, have always served traditional functions in 
Beti village society such as weddings, funeral essanas, so boys’ initiation 
ceremonies and the mevungu womens’ ritual.  However, in response to labor 
migration and urbanization throughout the 1950s and 60s, bikutsi adapted first to 
the orchestras of urban drinking establishments, and finally to electrification, 
transposing melodic lines from xylophone to guitar. Modern bikutsi belongs to 
this era, as ensembles such as Richard Band de Zoe Tele, led by Richard Nze, 
popularized traditional xylophone ensembles throughout Southern Cameroon.  
They played bikutsi, merengue, rumba and cha cha cha, with texts sung in Beti or 
French (Kubik, 2000).   
The final push came from guitarist Messi Me Nkonda Martin, often called 
the father of modern bikutsi.  Influenced by the rumba guitar sounds from Zaire, 
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Martin stuffed foam padding into his guitar to deaden the tone and more 
accurately imitate the sounds of traditional mendzan.  The sound was an instant 
success and his band, Los Comoroes, had a string of hits throughout the 1960s 








 The greatest bikutsi group of the popular music era, however, remains Les 
Têtes Brulées, formed in the early 1980s from previous members of Les Veterans. 
Têtes Brulées will feature more prominently in this work in later chapters, 
however it should be noted that their rise to fame in Cameroon, as well as success 
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abroad and international recording contract are phenomena intricately tied to the 
political and media environment of Cameroon in the 1980s. Jean-Marie Ahanda, 
singer, producer and image mastermind, deftly utilized newly available outlets 
and opportunities at a time when the embracing of Beti tradition as well as the 
economic realities of Cameroon’s masses represented an antithesis to the direction 
in which the Cameroon’s music industry had been headed. Long under the stalled 
development of the Douala-based makossa style, the music and recording scene in 
Yaoundé and Douala were stagnant until Paul Biya, a Bulu himself from 
Sangmelima, took over the presidency in 1982.  
 Musically, Cameroon had been dominated since independence and 
throughout the 1960s by the Douala/Sawa-based makossa style.  This is a guitar-
driven dance music, light on content and heavy on style and ambience, that 
borrowed musically from Congolese rumba and fashion-wise from Paris, where 
the majority of makossa has been recorded since the late 1970s. Makossa 
reflected nothing if not the cosmopolitan, and indeed outward-looking nature of 
some African music, yet was simultaneously a threat to no one locally, especially 
the government.  
 Makossa's greatest proponent outside of Cameroon is Manu Dibango, 
whose 1972 hit "Soul Makossa" put Cameroonian music on the map 
internationally, and African music on the charts in the United States for the first 
time. Ironically, Dibango has always asserted himself as a victim of the lack of 
imagination and creativity in Cameroon. He was shunned musically until proven a 
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hit overseas, and later was given very little support in his attempts to establish 
government-sponsored music and arts programs, and a national orchestra. 
However, even in absentia, he was seen fit to take over the directorship of the 
Cameroon Music Corporation from his base in Brussels in 2002.  
 It was between the dancehall slick makossa and Congolese soukous on 
one side, and the more traditionally-based bands that were often characterized by 
village instruments and exoticized local dress on the other, that Les Têtes Brulées 
would stake its claim. 
 
 
A Cargo Cult for the 21st Century 
 
 
What comes at the end of media restriction? Is cultism a creative response 
to the neuroses and anxiety of modernization? Or is it closer to the emancipatory 
promise of cargo in the new form of media? 
In noting the importance that imagination plays in the quotidian mental 
work of people in the post-electronic world, Arjun Appadurai wrote that, although 
now part of the logic of ordinary life, this type of thinking “has precedents in the 
great revolutions, cargo cults, and messianic movements of other times, in which 
forceful leaders implanted their visions into social life, thus creating powerful 
movements for social change” (Appadurai 1996: 5). 
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Cargo cults proper are movements arising from the impact of modern 
technology on developing cultures.  Thus, if Western trade goods (or cargo) typify 
prosperity, then traditional cultures unable to adopt Western culture are weakened 
by their influx.  Prophetic leaders then promise special cargoes of European 
goods, and devise the enactment of special rituals to drive foreigners away and 
concurrently speed delivery of the awaited cargo.  In most cases, the cargo is 
never associated with the Western economic system that produces it, and 
ultimately the cult cannot understand why it does not arise. 
It might be said that cargo cult mentality, on one hand, informs social 
movements that help people cope with problem of culture contact and change. On 
the other, however, it is the misapplication of indigenous cultural, magical or 
religious notions to a Western rational, economic or technological order.  If both 
magic and technology aim at presencing or concealing truth and power 
respectively, the difference of accounts rest on how various types of truth and 
legitimacy are assigned to Western versus Other. 
It would seem that the essence of cargo cultism is in the relationship 
between genuine desire and ineffective practice, or between rational ends and 
irrational means.  However Appadurai suggests that though often ordered in 
indigenous patterns, “the ritual practice of cargo cults is in many cases no less 
than a massive effort to mime those European social forms that seemed most 
conducive to the production of European goods.”  In a kind of reverse fetishism, 
what is replicated is what is seen as the most potent of European social and 
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linguistic forms in an effort to increase the likelihood of the arrival of European 
commodities (Appadurai 1986: 52). 
Cargo cult mentality is a redemptive process by which the social and 
moral order may be rebuilt after the expressed dissatisfaction with current cultural 
conditions. Manu Dibango, Cameroon’s most well-known musician, once spoke 
of the over-reliance that many Cameroonians exhibit on the concept of ancestors, 
and the assumption that Europe will eventually pay the local debt, both 
figuratively and literally (Dibango 1994). And Bayart wrote “ the celebration of 
the cargo cult of the postcolonial State, which is by definition in-egalitarian, 
affords the dominant actors the means of vociferously defending their material 
interests whilst at the same time laying claim to the highest ideals of development 
and public order” (Bayart 1993: 238). In this case, the cargo is no longer the 
goods coming off planes, but media images that make up the local imaginary.  
I spent an afternoon with the landlord’s brother. He was 27, stylish and 
unemployed. He lived in a shed in back of the main house, and clearly knew the 
score. We spent the majority of the afternoon at his favorite pastime, perusing a 
European airline shopping catalog, maybe 2 inches thick, full of electronics, fancy 
liquors and perfume, and presumably at the duty-free of his dreams. He argued 
the merits of one expensive watch over another, asked my preferences in scotches, 
and kitted himself out in Gucci and Versace. While at the same time both of us 
knowing full well he might never be able to afford a real pair of Levi’s to replace 
his Chinese knockoffs (Elvi’s). Which made me wonder…the next day we 
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wandered into the quartier Internet boutique, and I sat down with my ticket, 
opened a browser, and went straight to the browser history. There it was: Puma, 
Nike, Fubu, Sean Jean, Porsche, Ferrari, Sony, Apple.   
Thus, it is possible that cult hysteria is not neurotic reaction to disturbed 
society, but rather a positive process that plays a crucial role in situations of rapid 
change.  That is, rather than just the negative reaction of being unable to cope 
with unwanted change, or effecting that change yourself, we might see this move 
as a way of effecting radical change in a moral and societally valuable way.  
Ecstatic cults can be associated with stress and change because they inspire and 
validate innovation.  And in cases of failure, allow for the safe return of the old 
order with a minimum of social guilt and tension (Stephen 1977: 6).  Not unlike 
the concept of competing discourse, or field of opinion in questioning Bourdieu’s 
notion of doxa and habitus, a cargo cult can provide swift, efficient means of 
changing the ideological system to cope with change, to break with the past and 
move rapidly from one belief system to a new one, or to generate new moral 
orders and belief systems which are not imposed from the top down, but arise out 
of dreams and creative energies of villagers themselves (Bourdieu 1977: 168).  
Ultimately, in terms of Africa, and especially of Cameroon, one very 
common extension of the term targets misguided or abortive attempts to develop 
Third World economies.  Postwar faith in modernization and international 
development having failed, what once looked like global strategy now has the 
image of cargo cult.  As Lindstrom writes, “Dreams of Third World economic 
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development are as substantial as the arrival of ghostly white cargo ships” 
(Lindstrom 1993: 187).  Indeed, in Cameroon, it has been noted that the 
underlying mechanisms of cargo cults are to be found in development processes.  
“The picture which emerges from the discourse of Cameroon institutional 
representatives in this study is closely akin to the prayers made in the cargo cult, 
going so far in one case to inform European donors of their ‘prayful interest for 
greater things to come’”  (Langley 1986: 30).   
Back to Dibango, who wrote, “I once saw our real mother lode, our real 
cash crop, in creativity…creativity is our only path to health—making way for the 
imagination” (Dibango 1994). It seems that, from his unique vantage point, 
Dibango saw the desire for cargo, and knew that in the postmodern era, it would 
not come from ghost ships or airplanes, but media—in the form of images.  “The 
image,” Maffesoli wrote, “is culture. The image makes culture” (Maffesoli 1996: 
100). 
But what will people pin to their own concrete awakenings? Benjamin 
advocated this notion in the idea of finding the transgressive element in image 
proliferation.  For Benjamin, there is the possibility of a redemptive moment in 
images, and in the imagination it takes to navigate them.  Multiple images, then, 
have the ability to reveal their own inner contradictions, to fight rationality, and, 
opposed to classical Marxism, are not false consciousness.  He writes that 
“ambiguity is the pictorial image of dialectics, the law of dialectics seen at a 
standstill.  This standstill is utopia and the dialectic image therefore a dream 
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image.  Such an image is presented by the pure commodity” (Benjamin 1978: 
157).  Similarly, a reproduction is not merely a copy of an original, or false, for 
the act of copying, or the principle of reproduction, is built into the original work.  
Thus, it is in the proccessural, in the negotiation of daily life, in the choices made 
and not made.   
Perhaps the final word here belongs to those who recognize these 
possibilities, those who will make up the collectives, the unions, the social and 
civil society, and will not be defined by the rubrics of nationalism or 
development.  
Chapter Two is a case study, or rather a dialogue between the 
contemporary Les Têtes Brulées (my narration) and the formation of the original 
band (producer Jean-Marie Ahanda’s journal and personal reflections). The event 
is a band reunion of sorts, acted out on the political stage of America’s Fourth of 
July celebration at the Ambassador’s residence. As I have written elsewhere 
(Rathnaw 2005), LTB made their name by holding a mirror up to normative 
preconceptions of African music on the continent. Twenty years later, their 
version of strategic minstrelsy holds as much power as ever, and the results are 
equally as spectacular.  
Chapter three is a moral crisis that plays itself out in the media. Here I 
analyze the re-emergence of women bikutsi stars, and the accompanying crisis of 
morality that ensued in the media. Even as bikutsi was once the sole purvey of 
women, the combination of technology, media and foreign influence allows them 
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to take a leading role in a very different public look and sound. At the same time, 
it demonstrates Mbembe’s aesthetics of vulgarity by sharing in the lecher and 
obscenity of the phallocratic power elite. 
Chapter four is the story of the band Macase, their rise, fall and rise again, 
and the resulting music collective Culture Mboa Collectif. Using technology to 
form what I find to be elective communities, it shows one possible way forward 
from the stifling political and moral climate that has been contributing to the 
decline of the music industry in Cameroon. It also may point to a future that 
makes room for collectives oriented toward the rational pursuit of ends 
collectively arrived at.  
Finally, in chapter five, I examine the role of the royalties society, the 
now-failed CMC under the direction of Manu Dibango and the sham politics of 
re-instituting the organization. I contrast that with the Unites States Government’s 
inauguration of the promising-in-theory African Media Federation in Douala the 
same year. The failure of both governments’ ability to engender a culture of 
organization without fear of the preternatural accumulation of power and wealth 
presents a stark and startling similarity.  
As an ethnographic study of bikutsi practice and local consumption, along 
with radio, television and newspaper, and the government interaction that ties it 
all together, this work significantly increases our knowledge of a major 
geographical area on the African musical map.  It also deepens our understanding 
of the interaction of media, politics and popular culture in Africa at large in a way 
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that seriously, and for the first time, draws on detailed, media production–
oriented, empirical work.  
Finally, on the ground level, I tried to pay close attention to what 
Cameroonians refer to as “radio trottoir,” or sidewalk radio, which, as Jean-
François Bayart has written, “is the murmur of social practices which tirelessly 
fashion, deform and undermine the institutions and ideologies created by the 
highest of the high” (Bayart 1993).  Any serious study of culture in Cameroon 
must pay attention to this popular institution, which is both highly informative as 
it is entertaining, if not always so truthful. 
Everyone, it seems, is looking for transparency, which always comes back 
to radio trottoir, the circulation of sensational rumors by unofficial sources.  
Because of censorship, journalists have restricted opportunities for creativity.  
Since explanations are not usually given in response to national issues, 
information must be fabricated as a means of satisfying the curiosity of the 
population.  Though these stories are rarely unfounded, and most contain more 
than a germ of truth, facts are usually inflated above their true proportions.  So as 
President Biya cautions that truth comes from above while untruth circulates from 
below, radio trottoir continues to gain ground as a popular institution.  
If we take Jürgen Habermas's definition of the public sphere as that realm 
of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed, 
then we can see rumor, or radio trottoir as a popular form of knowledge 
production in Cameroon. Habermas writes that a portion of the public sphere 
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comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to 
form a public body. "Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an 
unrestricted fashion--that is, with guarantee of freedom of assembly and 
association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions--about matters 
of general interest" (Habermas 1964: 49). Of course, in Cameroon, there is no 
guarantee of such freedoms but in social life. Here, rumor belongs to the 
prevalence of non-traditional forms of communication and information 
transmission located primarily in the domain of orality and popular culture. 
Perhaps it is the only effective form of communication in an environment in 
which official discourse is the privileged domain of a hegemonic, centralized and 
monolithic government.  
 According to Nyamnjoh, radio trottoir constitutes a direct consequence of 
censorship and continues to develop, especially given that local media outlets 
have no credibility. It serves as an indicator of latent conflicts and of the global 
social dynamic. Radio trottoir is a vague form of counter-power. "Through rumor, 
the little people can bring down to their level the men in power, sometimes 
caricaturing them, often parodying them" (Nyamnjoh 2002: 175). Of course, to 
believe in stories without truth makes sense also in the framework of witchcraft, 
where one subscribes to a model of reality that consists of the visible as well as 
the invisible.  
 An example of a most bizarre act of rumor writ large occurred in February 
of 2006, when an independent newspaper in Yaoundé printed the infamous list of 
 53 
50--alleged homosexuals that included the names of high-ranking government 
officials, wealthy businessmen, entertainment stars and footballers. In a country 





Figure 8: the list of 50. 
 
 
The issue went into several print runs, and boys were selling photocopied lists on 
the street. Eventually, Communications Minister Pierre Moukoko Mbonjo--whose 
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name appeared on the list as well--had enough and had the publisher Jean Pierre 




 I found this project to be an exhilarating, if not always wholly organized 
venture. Waking up in the morning to decide if work that day involved radio 
stations, television studios, newspaper beats or musical performances in the 
cabarets made for a rich and rewarding, and never dull fieldwork experience. My 
hope is that that level of engagement and excitement comes through in the 
following chapters. Ultimately, I hope that this study will shed light on other 
media processes in other countries where the aims of the government, the people 














The real complexity in bikutsi is in the free. You have to be free in your mind. 
Completely free. 
 
--Steve Ndzana, from my first lesson on how 






 Manu Dibango, with his 1972 hit "Soul Makossa," his tours with the salsa 
mainstay Fania All-Stars, and the successful lawsuit against Michael Jackson 
certainly has to be considered Cameroon's most visible international star. But as 
he's spent his entire career between Paris and Brussels, he cannot make that claim 
inside his own country. That distinction belongs to the Les Têtes Brulées, who 
have been often been described to me as Cameroon's Beatles. Since inventing 
themselves at the Chacal Bar in Yaoundé in the early 1980s, exploding over the 
newly-inaugurated CRTV in 1987, and upstaging zouk supergroup Kassav at 
Stade Ahidjo, Têtes Brulées rise to stardom at home and abroad has sounded 
distinct resonances in the political spectrum as well as the media realm.  
 It can't be considered coincidence that contemporary bikusti performance 
so quickly overtook the mainstream preference for makossa after Paul Biya took 
 56 
presidential office in 1982. As a Bulu Beti from Sangmelima in the south of 
Cameroon, Biya was considered a great fan of bikutsi, and his second wife 
Chantal become an avid patron of the arts. Concurrently, the first years of 
television broadcasting exposed the entire urban population to new and rising 
bikutsi stars, and the installation of a recording studio at the CRTV ensured that 
plenty of material was available for the buying public.  
 However, I have written elsewhere that Tête Brulées stood apart from 
most other groups for their ability to quickly apprehend the possibilities of new 
technology, and utilize them in way that made bikutsi relevant for more than 
solely women's functions, or bawdy sex songs. They successfully negotiate the 
very same technologies of Western modernism while carefully constructing an 
identity situated firmly in a Black modernism, arguably a stage withheld from 
Africans in the European historical arc from Victorian colonialism to post-
modernity (Rathnaw 2002). 
Les Têtes Brulées has first to be understood as a media project.  The band 
was originally formed by Jean-Marie Ahanda, a former art and advertising student 
and then entertainment journalist for the state-sponsored Cameroon Tribune.  
Less a musician and more a media craftsmen, Ahanda realized the potential in 
bikutsi’s traditional strengths and recognized the public void that makossa was 
failing to fill.  In an interview he stated that he could challenge public perceptions 
with the proper promotion and production, “a unique image and a sound that was 
innovative yet rooted in Beti tradition (Fuller 1997: 5).   
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Ahanda collected a group of accomplished musicians, including 
Congolese-style rumba guitarist Theodore “Zanzibar” Epeme, and Les Têtes 
nurtured their uniquely accelerated, guitar-driven brand of bikutsi at the Chacal 
Bar in Yaoundé.  However, as unique as their sound may have been in the 
unchallenging music scene that had hold of Cameroon, it became increasingly 
apparent that music was the least of levels on which their brand of bikutsi was 
playing.   
The image of Les Têtes Brulées is their initial entrée: 
They look like a gang of science-fiction urban warriors with their shaved 
heads, painted bodies, cutaway clothes, designer sunglasses and 
skateboard body armour.  Their hybrid music is as wild and futuristic as 
their image…a mix of street credibility and bush culture (Ewans 1992: 
123). 
 
This brash, body-painted quintet has carved a punkish niche for itself in 
Cameroon’s pop scene as a self consciously anarchic alternative (Jackson 
1997). 
 
The name means the hot heads, or the burnt heads, but implies, more 
pointedly, the mind-blown.  They are truly hard to miss in a crowd.  The 
five-man line-up sports neatly torn t-shirts, elaborate dots-and-bars body 
paint over most of their skin, retro mirror shades, Afro mohawks, huge 
sneakers, and trademark Day-Glo book bags that they wear through their 
electrifying stage shows (Billboard 1991: 72). 
 
 What is most striking about Les Têtes Brulées is not their music, which, 
although a highly original style of central African pop, nevertheless follows many 
of the paradigms of African popular music, such as substituting guitars for 
indigenous instruments and playing over traditional dance rhythms.  Rather it is 
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their appearance, and how, under a state-censored media, they were able to 
negotiate not only local media and government restriction, but also a global 
market, which, at the time, had very distinct notions of what African musicians 
looked and sounded like. 
Charles Fuller, in his “History of Bikutsi in Cameroon,” offers this 
analysis of band’s image: 
 
With shaved heads and body painting representing scarification from 
traditional Beti ceremonies, the group immediately sent out an alternative 
message to the makossa-accustomed public.  The addition of a variety of 
colors to the body painting implied a further ironic tinge that the Têtes had to 
add color to their already “colored” skin.  The group sported torn tee-shirts to 
represent the real economic situation of their country, rather than the elite 
escapist image that other musicians presented. Finally, the group wore 
backpacks during their performance as an homage to the Beti women who 
traditionally tied babies onto their backs and danced bikutsi.  Thus the 
embracing of Beti tradition, as well as the economic realities of Cameroon’s 
masses, represented an antithesis to the direction that the music industry had 
been headed minutes before Les Têtes Brulées had appeared on CRTV (Fuller 
1997: 6). 
 
 While this is certainly an adept reading at a local level, I would move 
beyond this, onto the national and transnational stage.  It is apparent that Ahanda 
was consciously aware of the decisions he made in constructing the band, from 
the sound to the look to the promotion.  In 1987, only two years after music 
videos on CRTV, Cameroon’s public had become over-accustomed to the 
bourgeois chic and over-produced style presented in makossa videos.  Les Têtes 
Brulées was founded in part as a reaction against this popularly projected image, 
 59 
and partly as a way of breaking both the hold of local restriction and global 
expectation.   
With these various strategies, Ahanda was able to minstrelize the popular 
image while simultaneously creating, and submitting to, its cargo cult quality.  
Maffesoli expresses this perfectly when he writes that:  
 
the image has always been a place of refuge, a way of experiencing 
dissidence, the expression of that utopia, always renewed, that is the quest 
for a perfect society or, at the very least, for a society in which the weight 
of constraint and necessity would be less heavy.  Whence come the 
dreams, desires, and fantasies that it never ceases to arouse, and which 
every kind of power—ecclesiastical, political, intellectual—has always 
mistrusted. The ‘beautiful escape’ is inscribed at the very heart of the 
image; it always refers back to an elsewhere supposedly better, that one 
may live in a major key in moments of revolt, revolution, or important 
change (Maffesoli 1996: 121). 
 
Understanding the importance of the visual impact of their message, Les 
Têtes Brulées debut on CRTV’s music video program TelePodium, which was 
immediately followed by a large Tribune pictorial entitled “Decouvrons Les Têtes 
Brulées.”  Under the headline “TelePodium on fire with Les Têtes Brulées, the 
article stated that “Elvis had encountered the new Têtes Brulées,” and it had 
proved to be an enchanting and knowledgeable voyage toward a new bikutsi 
(Tribune 1987: 18).  As well, since he was a journalist for the Cameroun Tribune, 
it was no coincidence that the Tribune, a state-run paper, was responsible for a 
majority of their national press, including pieces he often wrote.  Between July 
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1987 and December 1989, no less than 41 features appeared in the Tribune, some 
penned by Ahanda, and others in the format of an Ahanda interview. 
Having lived, written and recorded in Paris, he was no stranger to the 
international music market.  Musically, Ahanda in interview has said, “I wanted 
to present musicians living in Cameroon, playing only bikutsi—the sort of music 
people don’t want, but that the musicians decide to play anyway and succeed” 
(Fuller 1997: 6). 
However, as Eric Lott has pointed out in his work on minstrelsy, there is 
no easy dialectic between mass cultural domination, that is, the incorporation of 
black culture fashioned to racist uses, and the celebration of an authentic people’s 
culture, the dissemination of black arts with potentially liberating results (Lott 
1995: 17).   
If the purpose of the minstrel mask is as much to maintain control over a 
potentially subversive act as to ridicule it, then in what Lott calls the “mixed 
erotic economy of celebration and exploitation,” it might be more productive to 
see Les Têtes Brulées as mastering the space of instability or contradiction in the 
form itself.  In terms of the transnational music industry, the media, and issues 
such as the commodification of black bodies, white or black pleasure, and the 
culture industry at large, Les Têtes Brulées offer self-mockery as well as 
subversion, blackness as well as racial domination, commodification as well as 
contestation.  As Lott rightly points out, "minstrelsy makes blackness flicker on 
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Updating the Past 
 
 
 The following section is a dual narrative of sorts spliced together from my 
recollections of a reunion show I was able to arrange for Les Têtes Brulées, and 
from snippets of Jean-Marie Ahanda's journal twenty years previous. Watching 
the band go through their motions, and discovering which of their certain tactics 
remained and were applied to what was an unusual circumstance turned out to be 




The Cultural Affairs officer called me one day in June. I was an oddity to 
those at the American embassy, being the only American, as they said, to have 
chosen to be in Cameroon. Yet there I was, and a music guy as well. “You know a 
lot of musicians. Do you think you can put a band together for the Ambassador’s 
4th of July party? Maybe some rock, country and a little jazz and blues?” I asked 
about the party. Every dignitary, diplomat, government official and VIP in the 
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country would be there, along with the small handful of Americans. “Lots of 
Cameroonians?” I asked.  Yes. “Press?” Of course. “You know,” I said, “they 
actually have bands in this country. Good ones. I’m working with one. They used 
to be very famous. I bet it would make a whole lot of people very happy to see 
them in such a prominent gig…very politic…you guys would be heroes…” 
 
All had started for me on my return to Cameroon, precisely to Yaoundé, 
on February, the year 1979. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing, the President of the 
French Republic, had just visited the country and everywhere it smelled 
fresh from the co-operation, with the still fresh flags, clean and remade 
streets, etc… As naïve as I was then, I had abandoned all my records and 
an important part of my books in France, thinking that Cameroon, 
following a normal evolution, would have been all that interested me then. 
I sailed without illusion into a fully forged National Unity, promising for 
the pioneers of the new-look Makossa. Nothing at this time led me to 
presume the coming arrival of bikutsi. The Cameroonian tradition was 
dying out in the years of struggle for independence, when the rare 
production houses had disappeared quickly because of violence, the 
independence fighters, and the consequent reaction of the colonizers 






Figure 9:  Jean Marie Ahanda, shortly after returning from France 
Courtesy of JMA 
 
 
And that’s how I put the band back together. Completely out of self-
interest, of course. I would finally get my shot to see and hear them live, and if I 
had to be honest, I was a fan. Cameroon was indeed the perfect country in which 
to live and work (though my initial infatuation died the same day the gendarmes 
started shooting and raping the striking university students at Yaoundé I. And the 
odd thing was no one seemed to care.). But it was the music that initially caught 
my attention, and it still had it. I had the records, I spent 2 years tracking down 
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their Clare Denis-directed documentary entitled Man No Run (I had the only copy 
in the country as it turned out), and I rehearsed my amateur afro pop band until 
they could struggle their way through Essingan. I was glad the embassy had their 
band, but delighted I had my backstage pass. 
 
Apart from making a bit of money from the instigators of this event, this 
concert served to decide amongst the three groups who quarreled and 
fought for the leadership in the town of Yaoundé, and perhaps Cameroon. 
The stakes were important, because the Hi-Fi did not yet exist, and only 
the big formations divided the lively market, marriages, and other 
important events. The big formations of the army and of the Republican 
Guard were just the point of reforming, since prestigious military bands 
had existed in the past. Personally, the first grand band that I had seen in 
my childhood was a military band with more than twenty members, in 
large uniform, and in my astonishment they performed salsa and 







Figure 10: Ahanda, when times were good 
Courtesy of JMA 
 
 
I thought, mistakenly, this would be my coup with Jean-Marie Ahanda, the 
founder and creative mind of the band. But he wasn’t interested. Then, after more 
badgering, he was interested only in the money, which wasn’t near enough (he 
had asked an outrageous sum). We went back and forth for weeks. His American 
wife got involved. He didn’t need the money and I wasn’t sure why he was 
balking. Of course, at the time, I didn’t understand the personnel dramas that had 
plagued the band for decades. Or the personal strife he had suffered from the 
press for being implicated in guitarist Zanzibar’s death (either witchcraft, or 
poison, depending on who you believe), and ultimately the break-up of the band 
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at their peak (jealousy and greed, or course). Finally, when I thought the whole 
thing would collapse, I walked into his studio one day and he told me they were 
going to play. Why the change of heart? “It’s for America," he waited and smiled. 
“We’re all fighting the terrorists.” Okay. 
 
Our youth had been influenced by music created by Americans groups 
such as O' Jays, the Cane and Able, Earth Wind and Fire, Brass 
Construction, Beatles, Rolling Stones, Jimi Hendrix, Alvin Lee, and a 
quantity of English groups such as Kinks, Spencer Davis Group, and some 
large groups of Jazz. The Congolese music seemed repetitive to us, 
populist, turning almost always around adventures met close to a fatal 
woman. Moreover the titles of the songs were invariably the first names of 
the women in question. It was the same for the French songs by Johhny 
Halliday, Richard Antony, Gall France and all the wave of singers present 





Figure 11: At work at the Tribune 




I hung around the studio for a few days to get an idea of what he had up 
his sleeve. All kinds of people came and went. Rachelle Tchoungi, an older, well-
known but slightly eccentric singer showed up one day. Then a bolt of the red, 
white and blue “Stars and Stripes Forever" pagne arrived. The Americans had 
made it especially for the party, and they would all be dressed in custom-made 
clothes made from it. All the while JM was uncharacteristically quiet with me. 
The day of the event I showed up to the studio early. He was there with Tunde 
Ondoua, the current Martiens (the ghosts of LTB) lead guitarist, and I suppose the 
acting Zanzibar for the night. The were chopping holes in shirts, and of course, 
the American-designed event cloth, which he had had made into pants. JM smiled 
while I watched him destroy, and design the fabric. It had begun.  
 
With Celeste Allelou, we decided on a new way of dressing Les Têtes 
Brulées, and he took care of the trousers and whims of t-shirts that I had 
afterwards to tear up in order to give them their final look. The result was 
amazing, because Celeste had perfectly realized my idea. I arrived on 
television the last, well that I did not turn up before so that they might stop 
me (Ahanda 1989). 
 
 
We met up that afternoon for set-up and sound check at the Ambassador’s 
residence. I felt more comfortable doing musician things, so I helped with sound 
equipment and drum set-up. I found everything but the bass drum pedal, and 
asked Afata where it was. As it turned out, it wasn't there, and here’s why: 
Ahanda felt the gig was too important for ordinary beat-up equipment, so in order 
to sound good, he borrowed the best drum kit in town. This happened to belong to 
Steve Ndjana, the owner of Le Petit Tam-Tam cabaret (and himself a great 
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drummer as well as director of the CRTV orchestra). I suggested we drive over to 
get the forgotten pedal. “No, we can’t do that,” he said, and left it at that. And 
then I realized what had happened: great gig, very prestigious, lots of money for a 
band that doesn’t even play together anymore--and Steve wasn't included in any 
way. Sure, take my drums, he was thinking. And try to play without a bass pedal.  
 
Many musicians, above all those of makossa, thought that I had helped 
myself in my position at the newspaper for the promotion of my personal 
affairs, according to the proverb which says that a goat grazes where it is 
tied up. What they ignored was the initiative of publishing seven pages on 
the artists in the governmental newspaper. That is necessary for being the 





Figure 12: The early Têtes Brulées in Europe 





Back at the studio that evening when all the musicians arrive, it’s like the 
layers of an archeological dig of the band’s history. Zanzibar had passed, of 
course, and too many guitarists had come and gone, but Tunde would play lead. 
Roger Bekongo had long ago taken the place of original rhythm guitarist Apache 
Ango, who would no longer have anything to do with Ahanda. Bass player 
Atebass was an original, but Soul Mangouma, his early replacement had also 
died, supposedly of AIDS. Afata Andre was one of two original drummers, and 
also a current member of Atebass’s Martiens.  
 
Zanzibar informed me that certain musicians had quit, but that the 
majority were ready to apply my plan of war. Among those who refused to 
follow this idea were Sala Bekono the singer, Nylon Azeme the drummer, 
Ndeko the guitarist who spoke none other than Lingala without being 
Congolese. Those who responded with enthusiasm to this call were: 
Zanzibar, Atebass, Apache Ango, and Afata, a curious drummer of my 
acquaintance. There was also the very young Owono who later became 
the celebrated Gibraltar Drakkus. I had added Owono because we had 
nobody to occupy the piano that the orchestra of CTV used at the time for 












Finally, Jean-Marie started opening bottles of paint. I had watched this 
over and over again in the documentary, and was looking forward to it. The room 
was quiet, ritualistic; everyone submitting to the brushstrokes with bent heads like 
a surrealist benediction. It was amazing to me that they had all managed to keep 
some semblance of a Tête Brulée hair-style going all these years. “Whatever they 
say, it’s best to die with your hair combed,” went the old TB motto. It was also an 
identity, carte blanche around town. Everyone knew them by the shaved hair, and 
seemed to appreciate the memories it retrieved.  
 
At this instant I had understood that I was going to carry out a vision of 
my painting applied to traditional expression and of the modern or 
contemporary image on the musical group, but also of metisse inspiration. 
When the moment came to prepare oneself for television, I sent to look for 
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razors, and when they were available, I indicated to each musician which 
drawing to execute on his skull in order to create an absolutely original 
hair style, in leaving here and there some tufts of hair that I came 
afterwards to line with different colors. I pulled geometric motives around 
the islets, multiplying the effects of illusion. When I painted round the left 
tufts and on the face with gouache, it realized the change carried out. It 
did not matter for me if the musicians took hold of the cultural stake of this 
approach.  It was essential that the adventure and the motives pleased 






Figure 14: Ahanda painting Tunde 
 
 
Then a horde of kids came in. Jean’s teenage son and his friends, steeped 
in Hip Hop and Rap, and having no interest in his father’s “old” music. We had 
once spent an entire afternoon debating the merits of Marvin Gaye versus 50 
Cent. Jean painted a small rune on each of their faces or foreheads. I looked at 
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him and he laughed at me (he was doing a lot of that), “Dance troupe,” he 
explained. At a certain point in my picture and note-taking, and getting in 
everyone’s way, I realized that I had become the Validating White of the 
documentary. Not that they need validating per se, and certainly not by me. More 
like I got the feeling that there was always a white guy hanging around, 
organizing, directing, fawning, exploiting. I couldn’t be sure which, or all. And it 
was also apparent they were well used to humoring and indulging (suffering?) 
him. I think I felt myself shrink into the corner a bit.  
 
In Paris, I had also met the independent journalist, Frank Tenaille, who I 
had given my services in order to discuss with him the aspects of the job 
that I did not understand, parts of the contract, what we vulgarly call the 
“business.”  The more I listened to him tell me of royalties, advances on 
royalties, past errors of such or such other group, the less I understood 








When I thought it was time to go, and excitement was high, everyone sat 
down for the pre-show warm up ritual. That is, everyone rolled a huge mbanga 
spliff and smoked out. This was definitely part of the reputation as far as I knew 
it. And after all these years it hadn’t changed. When it was time, I went to go for 
taxis, but they all laughed and Jean said, “We’re taking your car” (Toyota wagon, 
seats five). Pretty soon I had the entire band, guitars and bass in my car, all 
painted limbs and polka dots and stars and stripes. I thought of the circus gag car 
stuffed with clowns, and how this might look piling out at the Residence.  
 
The end of this night held some rather unpleasant surprises for me, this by 
the fault of Lappe, who had decided at the last minute before going up on 
stage to light a joint. It was in Douala during the high rainy season. It was 
terribly hot and Pasteur had to my knowledge never smoked a bomb. 
Suddenly on stage he begged me to lead him to the bathroom because he 







Figure 16:  Roger Bekongo took this whole night very seriously 
 
 
Unfortunately, I didn’t get the chance to see the car gag to fruition. 
Security detail at the residence gate had changed, and apparently they weren’t 
aware that this car full of painted and stoned musicians was expected inside. This 
is where I finally became of some use, surprising, I think, to everyone. I happened 
to know that the property next to the Residence belonged to the head of the 
Cultural Affairs section (my people, I suppose). I also happened to know that 
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there was an escape tube that ran underneath the shrubbery in that yard, and 
through to a hidden exit in the Ambassador’s yard, in case of terrorist attack or 
emergency escape. And that is how we arrived at the 4th of July party, me and Les 
Têtes Brulées, crawling through the escape tunnel and crashing through the 
bushes into the Residence.  
 
Our police officer got out of his car with the bearing of his occupation and 
found himself face to face with us demanding to see our identity papers 
and to know the reason for all the disguising at this nocturnal hour. The 
civil servant was convinced that we came from holding up the service 
station, disguised as clowns, and that our rushed departure that of an 









The gig was a touch bizarre from the start. Ahanda made a big deal out of 
introducing Rachelle, and she opened the proceedings like an avant-jazz ball 
game. There was a very deconstructed version of "God Bless America," 
interspersed with snatches of Swing Low, Sweet Chariot," some scat, a couple 
primal screams, and a little Ewondo chant thrown in for good measure. It was 
obvious people were confused and a little uncomfortable. Were they being 
mocked on their own holiday, or was this homage to everything American? The 
artistry of it was undeniable, however, and the crowd clapped when they were 
supposed to. Les Têtes Brulées then opened their set, but I knew immediately they 
were flat, perhaps a little un-energized. Musicians who smoke, in my experience, 
are usually not as good as they think they are. Still, ripped up stars and stripes and 
all, it was a spectacle, and the crowd ate it up—the Americans for the novelty of 
it, the Cameroonians because it was their music and their musical heroes.  
 
When the first images of our recordings took place, it was not only a total 
surprise, but also a generalized delirium and a reversal of the hierarchy of 
artists and genres. It was the birth of bikutsimania, which had to dishevel 
a certain number of folds already taken on television and in society. The 
press had seen the event in delirious terms, taking back the term of the 
martiens, which spread immediately everywhere the Cameroonian 
television was visible. Cameroon Tribune had devoted no less than seven 
pages to those that it had called the musketeers of Cameroonian and 




In the middle of the set, the band broke down into a funk groove, and out 
came the dancers. JM had orchestrated this thing to the hilt. They robot-ed, 
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locked, popped, and hip-hopped their way around dance floor/tennis courts for a 
while and ran off. Hip-hop and rap may yet contain the ethos of American 
gangster, but it is undeniably the defacto soundtrack of Africa in this decade. 
Even African pop styles such as hiplife in Ghana and coupé décalé in Côte 
d'Ivoire are incorporating its elements and visual style.   
 
In Paris, we missed originality completely. In the Zulu Gang for example, 
our producers at AB productions had urged us to record disco music, and 
to pretend to be African-Americans to gain the mobility like stars such as 
Boney M, or Donna Summer and C Jerome. The music that we had to 
make was to have an American accent, with clacking choppers, and the 
American manner of singing. We all had a remote relationship with our 
music of origin. Apart from the repertoire known by the Cameroonian 
bands of Manu Dibango, and some Zaireans such as the Large Men of the 
Maquis, our experiment with African music was limited (Ahanda 1989). 
 
 
Finally, they broke out "Essingan," and conjured enough energy to make it 
exciting. This wasn’t the gig I had been looking forward to, however, and I don’t 
think the band was all that into the venue or the crowd. Yet I knew it was going 
the way JM had planned it, and he was having his fun anyway. Afterward we 
milled around for a bit, until the entire American crowd took to the tennis courts, 
resplendent in their matching print cloth, for a giant two-stepping exhibition. We 
went back to the studio.  
 
Playing music with Zanzibar had you no matter what. After working 
through my songs we did the final version of “Essingan,” and then we 
prospected even more deeply in the repertoire of the mvet. During this 
time Zanzibar had already composed “Nadege”. This means he already 
put himself to the service of Bikutsi exclusively and started to reduce the 
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songs based on rumba. He multiplied all that flowed to him once the tap 






Figure 18: Two-stepping in Yaoundé 
 
 
We're back at the studio and there is a veritable crowd now, and people are 
starting to come to life. Still painted and dressed, and nowhere to go. Or so I 
thought. Back in the cars and we head to Boi d’Ebene, the swankiest cabaret in 
town. The place is packed, and there is a band onstage, but when LTB walks 
through the front door, the house erupts. They immediately take the stage, it’s hot, 
it’s crowded, it’s loud, but people are thrilled as the band spends the next hour 
tearing the house down. And they finished with an "Essingan" that would have 
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made Zanzi proud. Long day, long night, but I finally got what I came for. And I 
thought maybe this was the point of it all for them as well.  
 
In the bar, it was a party. Seated in the new chairs from the studios of the 
Chacal’s patron carpenter, the spectators applauded at all breaks in the 
show. All sorts of night scenes were flourishing around the interior of 
Chacal bar. At the exterior, on the grounds managed by the patron, 
appeared the sellers of grilled meat and of cigarettes. A fat Eton woman 
distributed kolas. Bitter kolas, the “starters”, and all sorts of spices and 
aphrodisiacs such as the kola from the lions and caterpillars, and I passed 
it. A regular client of these frenzied saturnalias , she probably never sold 
as much of the rubbish in her life. For those of us in this adventure, things 




 A few days later I drop by the studio to say hello. JM has resumed his 
place on the couch, project over, holding court to his cronies. I tell him I have a 
video of the gig at the residence, and I’d be happy to dub him a DVD. “Ha!” he 








**Radio Trottoir says:  the American ambassador’s grounds were terraced out 
over a large estate. A friend (of a friend) was (apparently) standing behind the 
French ambassador, who was standing up top, surveying the scene with dismay. 
Hundreds of guests enjoying the tropical gardens, scattered bars and buffets, 
exciting music. Everything lavish and in excess, perfect. Next to him stood a 
high-ranking Cameroonian, obviously familiar with the ambassador, and noting 
the success of the evening, and the zeitgeist of French futility. [In fact, it was 
palpable. Africans were still reeling in the wake of the Paris rioting of 2005. 
Gross mismanagement and the attitude toward their immigrants was felt like a 
 80 
slap in the face.] The U.S. had opened its grand new embassy on the golf course, 
and tonight had won the great publicity war. They had successfully staged the 
reunion of Les Têtes Brulées, truly Cameroon’s favorite sons (Dibango had left, 
after all). Tomorrow the papers would be in love with the event, the Fourth of 
July, and America. The Cameroonian turned to the Ambassador and smiled, 























The Eroticization of Bikutsi: 
 







Eroticism is a disequilibrium in which the being consciously calls his own 
existence in question. 
  




Cameroon’s relationship with bikutsi contains a paradox made apparent to 
me immediately upon my arrival in the country, and remained a central theme 
throughout my time there. My first few nights in Yaoundé were spent in the 
Faculté de Theologie Protestante, a small seminary compound that rented rooms 
with a common lounge and kitchen. The building was overseen by a 
housekeeper/cook who eyed me with curiosity the whole of the first morning as I 
assembled my notes and plan of action. Finally, she overcame her polite silence to 
approach, and ask about my mission in Cameroon. “I study bikutsi,” I answered, 
what I thought was innocently enough. She looked at me skeptically, then leaned 
in, almost conspiratorially. She whispered, “The bikutsi is everywhere.” And then 
she stood up and with obvious disgust remarked, “But it is immoral. 
Pornography.” She walked away and didn’t speak to me again. 
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Three days later I had moved into private lodgings, and again the woman 
of that house inquired about my work. When I told her about the bikutsi, she took 
an obvious interest, both delighted and somewhat confused. I took the opportunity 
to relate the previous story from the Faculté. “Ha!” she scoffed. “That woman is 
the worst kind of hypocrite. She prays to Jesus in the day, and at night she goes 
home to dance bikutsi.” 
Baudrillard once wrote that we undoubtedly perform the act of obscenity 
and of pornography, just as others play the game of ideology and bureaucracy 
(Baudrillard 1987: 34). And Achille Mbembe, writing about Cameroon after 
independence, put it another way, “in the specific historical context of domination 
and subjection, the postcolony neither minces nor spares its words” (Mbembe 
2001: 108). 
In his book, On the PostColony, Mbembe defines the 'postcolony' as 
marked by a liking for the ceremonial and by an exhibitionism that is the more 
remarkable considering how illusory are the states' practical achievements. 
Furthermore, power is exercised with a degree of violence and naked exploitation 
that has its antecedents in previous colonial regimes. People's response is often a 
ribaldry that revels in the obscene. Mbembe’s singular move here is to invert 
Bakhtin’s notion of the “Carnivalesque” as belonging to the public space, or as he 
says, the grotesque and obscene belonging to the unofficial culture.   
Distinguishing himself from Bakhtin, Mbembe argues that ''the postcolony 
is made up not of one 'public space' but several, each having its own logic and yet 
 83 
liable to be entangled with other logics'' (Mbembe: 104). As a result, this space 
often overlaps with that of the elite or governing class in an intimacy, almost a 
complicity we might say, that turns power and play into performance. Thus, the 
obscene in Cameroon is an essential characteristic that identifies not only the 
public sphere of ordinary people, but is also intrinsic to postcolonial regimes of 
domination. In this sense it helps erect, ratify or deconstruct them. 
That the regime allows for the play of vulgarity, revelry and exhibitionism 
outside the limits set by the party line demonstrates not only the pretense and 
unreality of its power, but also conveys its total lack of restraint and taste for 
lecherous living.  Mbembe writes, “what gives rise to conflict is not the references 
to the genitals of those in power, but rather the way individuals, by their laughter, 
kidnap power and force it to examine its own vulgarity.” 
If we accept this reading, Mbembe could have found no more accurate 
demonstration of his observation than in the contemporary music scene of 
Cameroon, and in particular of the way the music bikutsi has developed from a 
women’s village song form to a hotly contested media, moral and cultural debate.  
The development of a more liberalized media, as well as the influx of foreign 
media streams has helped foster different, but I might argue complementary, 
directions in the popular culture of recent years. This has caused somewhat of a 
dilemma in what has been termed a masculinist or phallocentrically cultured 
society, as women have come to play a more dominant role in the public voice.   
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This chapter examines the development of the Cameroonian music bikutsi 
from traditional song form to media, moral and cultural issue—a site of 
contestation between local media officials and an increasingly more 
internationally influenced and liberalized media. I analyze the experience of 
bikutsi as mediated by politics and external and internal views and consumption. 
As the Cameroonian media undergoes a process of democratization highly 
influenced by foreign media, local musicians and video artists become actors in a 
conflicted and uncertain environment.  On the one hand are issues of nation-
building and cultural development in the face of dominant foreign media, and on 
the other, the multitude of images, sounds and forms of popular culture that 
people attach themselves to in their daily imaginings.   
Bikutsi is a style that belongs to the mendzan xylophone tradition, and is 
linked to the cultural traditions of the Beti people of central Cameroon.  However, 
from the time of its exposure on Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) in the 
early 1980s, it has developed into a highly eroticized, even pornographic music, 
sometimes referred to as the "songs of Sodom and Gomorrah."  This phenomenon 
instigated a crisis of cultural and media ethics, resulting in government media 
bans and television programming such as CRTV's "Deviance," hosted by Ministry 
of Communications director Gervais Mendo Zé from 2003 to 2005. 
I will show that, as Mbembe has alluded to, obscenity as a political choice 
must be regarded as more than a moral category. Rather it constitutes one 
modality of power in the postcolony, where, “in a desire for majesty, the masses 
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join in the madness and clothe themselves in cheap imitations of power.  And 
conversely, power, in a violent quest for grandeur, makes vulgarity and 
wrongdoing its main mode of existence” (Mbembe: 133).  I suggest that the 
conscious use of technology, the media, and images of the body by performing 
women, historically excluded from the social administration, constitutes an 
attempt to re-establish and define a critical voice. Concurrently, it expands the 
sphere of music performance that allows for a more total saturation, and indeed an 
overflow, of the usual limits of production and reception. 
As an unaccompanied Beti women’s song form, bikutsi not only served as 
a form of accompaniment and entertainment, but also served as commentary and 
socialization, teaching advice, and demarcated a private space for women to speak 
in an un-edited manner. Cameroonian cultural scholar Onguene Essono writes, 
“bikut-si talks about family matters, jealousy, sweet or rough words for our loved 
ones. It is an anthem to heroes, reconciliation words for enemies or lovers, advice 
and wishes to children, complaints and critique to elders or traditional authority” 
(Essono 1996: 52).  
Commentary on the institute of marriage, the trials of love, and the 
problems as head of house made up the vast majority of its themes, and songs 
often served as counsel and advice for young women getting married.  Thus 
bikutsi was born into a need for creating a private space in a marginalized society, 
where the women could give expression to what usually amounted to an oblique 
style of criticism.  
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Good bikutsi is almost universally judged by its lyric competence. While it 
is true that themes can be intensely suggestive or downright lewd, the best singers 
are said to be oblique, poetic, and masters of Ewondo linguistic codes and 
references (Mbala 1985; Ghonda 1987). At one point in my work I asked 
Professor Essono to hear his tapes of old singers recorded in the villages for the 
early radio communitaire project. I assumed these were the kind of singers he was 
referencing. He said he had something better, and put on a CD that I immediately 
recognized to be Sally Nyolo, ex-singer of the internationally renowned world 
music group Zap Mama. I heard synthesizers, fake string pads, a drum machine—
all the trappings of a Paris producer. “That’s good bikutsi?” I asked incredulously. 
“Oh, great bikutsi! Just listen to those words! She speaks perfect Ewondo. You 
don’t hear that anymore.”  
By the same token, Cameroon’s media-scape has undergone dynamic and 
for some, unsettling changes in recent years.  The state-controlled audio-visual 
sector, which has been absolute since its inception in 1986, has gradually 
loosened to allow private radio since 2000, along with a few fledgling television 
concerns in the past years.   Although in principle, private radio and television has 
been allowed by law since 1990, as of yet no licenses have been issued, leaving 
the door open to further intrusion by an always nervous government.  
Government declarations since Independence have often stressed the 
importance of the media in the attainment of cultural, economic and political 
development objectives.  It has always called upon the media to play a leading 
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role in disseminating information and mobilizing Cameroonians toward self-
reliance, autonomy and independence in economic, cultural and political matters.  
In fact, a 1987 law states that all audio-visual communication must assure an 
essentially public-interest mission, and carried the motto: Inform, Educate and 
Entertain.  However the mission to inform had to be carried out “in a spirit of 
responsibility” and in a way that related the facts in an objective manner, 
permitting everyone to better appreciate their contribution to the common task of 
nation-building (Nyamnjoh 1990: 111).   
At the advent of CRTV, the president was quoted as saying that 
“television will more appreciably consolidate the basis of our ideals of stringency 
and moral rectitude, liberalization and democratization, further testifying to our 
efforts to build our country in unity, freedom and social justice. Information, 
above everything else, provides the people with the additional moral and 
intellectual arms in the performance of their tasks” (Nyamnjoh 1989: 36). 
However as private radio and television broadcasting has ramped up, 
media content has strayed as far from the moral and intellectual arms as the 
government might have assumed.  Cameroonians of late have access to DStv 
satellite packages from South Africa that include M-NET, SuperSport, the various 
world news agencies from across Europe, and of course, MTV-Africa as well as 
Trace Music-South Africa.  It is interesting to note that Trace blocks out certain 
late hours out for a program called Adult Trace, which plays alternate soft-core 
versions of Western urban music videos. Further, Adult Trace becomes straight 
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hardcore pornography for a number of hours after midnight, a development that 
has proved quite popular among the young adults.   
 The CRTV became a more embedded presence into the 1990s, and as 
more foreign programming became available, bikutsi developed in two distinct 
directions. Essono noted that while traditional artists from the village have always 
had a relative degree of freedom of speech in Cameroonian society, it was only 
after the advent of multiparty democracy and advances in expressive freedom that 
bikutsi artists began to sing with impunity against the regime in the name of 
democracy.  He noted how themes often came from the view of the poor, or those 
that remained most loyal to the power.  However they always respected a sense of 
social code, even when speaking of what was unacceptable. This is an excerpt 
taken from a CRTV Radio Centre show called Bebela Ebug, which programmed 
older “village-style” bikutsi. It is not a coincidence that bebela ebug is the 
Ewondo for “truth,” or “plain talk.” 
 
Nkol-Bikok – Hope of Revival 
 
Paul Biya where is the money?  
But so where has the money gone? 
The macabo sells off, but salt is worth gold. 
Manioc sells off while beef is untouchable. 
Banana sells bad, the city of Yaoundé is expensive. 
Paul Biya where is the money?  
But so where has the money gone? 
So what have you done with the money? 
 
Father Paul Biya, why do you abandon hope of revival? 
We need to live decently father Paul, we need credits. 
Hope of revival is falling behind, Why so? Why don’t we have credits? 
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We farm our fields, we harvest peanuts. 
Our products do not sell well, and we do not have credits. 
So why father do you leave us fall behind. 
 
Paul Biya, anticipating the crisis, fled foolishly, 
Thinking we are dying. 
Then, if you have any sadness, surrender to your father,  
He will save you. 
If you happen to need salt, my sister, why cry?   
Go to Paul. 
If soap, medicines, oil happen to be scarce my sister,  
There is your father. 
(Essono 1996: 55-57) 
 
This musico-political trajectory was termed “bikutsi engage,” and it was 
critical, voiced by the “small people” and especially by those of his Biya’s 
bulu/beti ethnic group—those whom he was meant to protect.  
The second direction was referred to variously as “bikutsi porno,” CSM – 
Cameroon Sex Music, or the Songs of Sodom and Gomorrah (Ndjana 1999).  
More freedom of expression, coupled with more access to technological modes of 
exposure, meant women, as well as men, could and did push the basis of bikutsi to 
new extremes.  As well, the local economic collapse of the mid-90s meant even 
more ammunition was handed to a public ready to turn it back on the increasingly 
failing government. 
Guitarist Messi Martin was a key figure who jumpstarted the rage for non-
impressionistic lyrics by using shock words that disrupted the syntax of the song. 
This proved to be a perfect strategy for radio, and eventually became the standard 
for television as well. Les Veterans, one of the most popular bands of the modern 
bikutsi era, penned the song, “Sima Andegele” that included the words:  
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Qui veut dire, en quelque sorte  Who wants to say, to some extent  
Le sous-vêtement est genant   Under-clothing is constricting 
C’est un obstacle    It is an obstacle  
C’est à l’aube     At dawn  
Au petit matin     In the early morning  
Quand chante le coq    When the cock sings 
Que l’on connait les vrais hommes  One knows the true man 
Sima Andegele    Sima Andegele 
 
This song was played endlessly on the radio, and the live version that 
played in the nightclubs extended the narrative into far more graphic descriptions 
and language.  This was accompanied by a dance that mimicked the words and 
acted out various sex acts involved.  In fact, it became normal practice to have a 
thoroughly x-rated version for the nighttime public, and a sedate version for the 
radio.  A further galvanizing moment was provided by the singer Petit-Pays, who 
included himself fully nude on the cover of one of his cassettes. While people 






Figure 19:  Petit-Pays, King of Makossa Love 
 
I’ll focus on perhaps the most famous, and infamous performer of this 
period, Katheryn Edoa Ngoa, or K-tino, as she is known.  Due to her sexually 
outrageous lyrics and shocking stage performances, the popular press named her 
“femme du peuple,” “mama bonheur” and “mama la joie” and she became a bane 
to the censors and media officials.  Her lyrics were graphic, her dance imitative of 





Figure 20:  Publicity photo 
 
 
Older women called her immoral, younger women imitated her, and everyone 
played her records and videos.  This is an example of one of her earlier hits, 




The lift, every male’s secret 
I like men who are no fools 
Those who know how to press my sensitive button 
The lift, that’s every male’s secret 
I like a man who is no fool 
I like a man who will suck me downstairs 
I like a man who will suck me upstairs too 
I like men who sin on earth 
I like men who sin in heaven too 
Even the parish priest loves that 
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Instead of giving me a private service 
He comes home to sin downstairs 
And I like the priest who sins upstairs too 
And his mass will not be sad as a funeral ceremony 
Because every male is a boss 
Even in his pajamas 
But only when he’s strong and big 
With his prick as solid as a man’s gun 
Solid as a church’s big candle 
And I’ll lick him up and down 
And then, and only then I’ll ask him 
To press the button in my lift 
(Nkolo 1994: 325) 
 
 
There is very little of the so-called “hidden style” of language known as the 
hallmark of good bikutsi. Even the church here is not off limits. However, K-tino 
became known for pushing the boundaries of taste and decency as her career 
progressed. One of the most popular records of 2005 in Cameroon was her track 
entitled La Queue de Ma Chatte, which hardly struggles at all behind its 
metaphor:   
 
 
La Queue de Ma Chatte 
 
Dédicace à ma chatte et sa queue 
Ah, n’est-ce pas? 
 
(Refrain) Aïe, Aïe, Aïe, Fais attention, fais attention 
Ne touche pas à ma chatte 
Si tu touches à ma chatte je te crée des problèmes 
(refrain) Aïe, Aïe, Aïe, Fais attention, fais attention 
Ne touche pas à ma chatte. 
Docteur Veterinaire, si tu touches à ma chatte 
Ne touche pas à sa queue 
(refrain)  
Chat au féminin on l’appelle la chatte 
Chat au masculin on l’appelle le chat Oh oh 
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(refrain) 
Medecin vétérinaire, examine ma chatte 
Caresse ma chatte sans toucher à sa queue 
(refrain) 
Je dis fais attention 
Ne touches pas à ma chatte 
Quand tu touches à ma chatte, je me mets à pleurer 
(refrain) 
Chat au masculin, on l’appelle le chat, 
Chat au féminin on l’appelle un “galisingowe” 
(refrain) 
C’est sans commantaires 
Si tu touches à ma chatte,  
ne touche pas à sa queue. 
(refrain) 
Quand je vois la souris, 
Ça me rappelle un minou, 
Quand je vois mon mari 
Et j’enlève “l’okale” 
Fouda Pierre junior 
Méritait le respect. 
N’est-ce pas? 
Il fait souvent la queue. 
Enam Alain tu me rappelles long bon. 
Il fait souvent la queue. 
Status: y’a Guy. Rouge: c’est aux hommes 
Merci pour toutes les queues à la queue-leu-leu 
Qui m’ont soutenues, 
Hein? N’est-ce pas? 
Queues à ce minou, 
N’est-ce pas? 
Status: fermez. Rouge: ouvrez! 
Ne vous en-faîtes pas 
Papa a du succès. 
À cause de la queue! 
Abessolo Roger a fait des merveilles. 
Pourquoi? À cause de la queue! 
Samais et Gustave respectons à Lome 
Pourquoi? À cause de la queue! 
André protège le cheval 







I dedicate this song to my pussy and its cock  
AAAH, wouldn’t you say? 
 
(Refrain) Aie, aie, aie, Do beware,  
do not touch my pussy 
If you touch my pussy, I’ll be giving you trouble. 
(refrain) Aie, aie, aie, Do beware,  
do not touch my pussy 
Dr. Veterinarian, if you touch my pussy 
Do not touch his cock 
(refrain) 
A female is a pussy 
A male is a cat Oh oh 
(refrain) 
Dr. Veterinarian, check out my pussy, 
Pet my pussy, without touching his cock 
(refrain) 
I say, do beware! 
Do not touch my pussy, 
When you touch my pussy, I start to cry. 
(refrain) 
A male cat is a cat, 
A female cat is a “galsingowe” 
(refrain) 
No comments needed. 
If you touch my pussy, 
Do not touch his cock. 
(refrain) 
When I see the mouse, 
I remember the kitty. 
When I see my husband, 
I take off the “okale”. 
Fouda Pierre Junior, 
Deserved respect. 
Didn’t he? 
He can’t wait to come in. 
Enam Alain, I remember you long and good. 
He can’t wait to come in. 
Status: Guy is here. Red: time for the men. 
Thanks for the queuing cocks, 
Who have sustained me. 
What? Didn’t they? 
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Cocks to this pussy, 
Aren’t they? 
Status: closed. Red: Open! 
Do not worry, 
Daddy made it. 
Because of his cock! 
Abessolo Roger did wonders. 
Why? Because of his cock! 
Samais and Gustave are respected in Lomé 
Why? Because of their cock! 
André protects the horse 
Especially because he fathered them. 
 
 
Of course, by adding the “t-e” to the end of the French “chat”, K-tino effectively 
changes “cat” to the slang for female genitalia. And the “tail” then belongs to the 
willing male. Female singers all over Cameroon love to perform this, as it gives 
them the opportunity to cavort with male patrons and elicit attention in the way of 
cash tips, or gumbo.   
 In emphasizing the importance on local linguistic codes, and also the 
ability of patrons to read between the lines of intended lyrics, I include a 
translation of the same song by a Cameroonian associate. The impression one gets 






This song is an homage to all the dicks I am fucking! 
AAAh! is not it right? 
(Ewondo) 
Zim kam zoo woo! 
Gue me sim ga zoo woo 




Aie Aie Aie Do not finger my Godamn Pussy! 
I am telling you be afraid, do not try to finger my pussy!  
It smells like real dicks, you better believe it! 
(Refrain)  
Aie Aie Aie Don't you dare finger my Godamn Pussy! 
You fucking Veterinarian doctor! What do you fucking know?  
If you dare finger my pussy, the smell of real dicks will fuck you up! 
Thus, be afraid of my pussy, if you try to finger my pussy,  




Ah! Tonton Ambroise Voundi etc... 
Pussies are made to be fucked by real cocks! 
(Refrain) 
You fucking vet. Doctor examine my pussy, do not try to smell the dicks!  
It will fuck you up! 
(Refrain) 
Miaou (orgasm scream) 
I am telling Doctor, be afraid of my pussy,  
do not try to smell my pussy,  
I am warning you, it smells like real cocks! 
It’s all about a hard cock and fucking! 
(Refrain) 
I do not have to add anything else, forget about fingering my pussy! 
Aladji Toure's big daddy  
(Ewondo) 
I do not know why mice remind me of fucking 
That's why, every time my man shows up, I am reading to fuck! 
(Refrain)  
Fucking is so great! 
Fouda Pierre's big cock is so great 
Enam Alain what a great fuck! 
Thanks for all the cocks! 
Thanks for all the cocks that keep me going! 
Mendouga Bertrand, daddy knows how to do it, isn't he? 
Abessolo Roger, you know how to work it 
Let's give a shot to Sama Gustave 




This is often the tenor of the imagery I would get by having an Ewondo speaker 
interpret lyrics for me at performances. There is an understanding of listening 
beyond the level of spoken lyric in live performance, where very little is ever 
deemed inappropriate. 
The very first time I heard Ma Chatte was at a very stylish cabaret in 
Douala. I watched a woman in a black sequined cocktail dress and stiletto heals 
perform the number in front of a well-heeled crowd and their cocktails. Imagine 
my surprise when she danced by our table and meowed while petting her crotch. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, I witnessed a number of different versions of 
the same song in karaoke bars throughout Yaoundé. The participants in 
Cameroonian karaoke clubs act out the choreography of popular videos to 
recorded playback rather than actually singing the vocals. This gives the 
performer of Ma Chatte the chance to climb on tables or men’s laps, acting out 
various sex acts and in various states of dress. Shocking perhaps, and humorous, 







Figures 21-22: Screen capture from video 
 
 
This new bikutsi was denounced in various presses as immoral and in 
violation of the norms of decency.  One panicked journalist wrote, “Cameroon has 
exhibited a looseness of morals unprecedented. The debauchery and the sexual 
perversions are of the most immoral, and affect everyone.  Sex, of the most vulgar 
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manner, is more and more present in the media and the public, marked by 
eccentric, indecent clothing intended to provoke sensual pleasure, nudity, and 
sensuality.”  
If K-tino has gained a reputation as the most bawdy or pornographic 
singer in Cameroon, she defends her performance in interview, saying: 
 
I speak of love because I don’t like war and politics.  Madness, everyone 
needs some at one time or another, to know if one exists. I know what I do. 
This madness enables us to alleviate accumulated stress. In these times, 
we have the right and the need to laugh and to heal certain small diseases. 
And I think that I was born to make others laugh. I accept this place. I am 
not vulgar, I do not make vulgar spectacles. If I am vulgar, then the 




 She alludes to two things here: the dysfunctional nature of the political 
system, and the foundation of bikutsi rooted in the mastery of the Ewondo 
language. While veiled innuendo and metaphor still existed in many instances, 
though not in all, the dances became parodies of sex, and were often accompanied 
by graphic lyrical imagery. Cameroonian music writer Mono Ndjana wrote that 
the sociological in art had indeed become the biological. 
If, as has been suggested, we are to look at the Cameroonian media as the 
voice and guardian of official state power, it is possible to see these developments 
as the CRTV losing control of that facade, and it was certainly viewed that way 
from within.  Minister of Information and Director General of CRTV Mendo Ze 
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made it his personal mission to re-moralize society. First, a moral crisis was 
declared. That was quickly followed by a cultural crisis as well. 
In reaction to the moral dilemma, music video shows such as Tubevision 
and Clipbox, easily some of the most popular programming on air, were 
drastically curtailed or cancelled outright. The weekly cultural and news show, 
TamTam Weekend, replaced its live music with recorded playback of makossa 
songs, which had always been deemed eminently safe for Cameroonian culture. 
The reaction to the cultural dilemma was to effectively ban the recordings 
and videos of Congolese ndombolo and Ivoiren mapouka in order to avoid 
“promoting indecent behavior” among the country’s youth. These are styles of 
dance music rhythmically similar to Congolese rumba or soukous, but 
incorporating sexually suggestive dance with varying degrees of nudity. 
According to Mendo Ze, the dances had to be banned in order to “safeguard the 
good morals and culture of Cameroonian society from foreign invasion.  
Suggestive body wriggling,” he commented, “cannot be tolerated.” 
The move played nicely into the themes of cultural crisis and loss, as the 
CRTV officially lamented that it had been playing ndombolo as if Cameroonian 
music did not exist, and hoped the ban would help revive the culture.  Official 
radio policy following that announcement allowed for 30% time to foreign music.  
The happiest recipients of this policy were the local makossa musicians, whose 
music had been in drastic decline thanks to the meteoric rise of bikutsi, and the 
influx of French pop, ndombolo and rap.  
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 Jean Francois Mebenga, then director of programming at CRTV, 
commented that, “as state owned media, we have a duty to educate the masses. 
We have to maintain a certain measure of decent social morals. This dance, 
played over our radio and television, encourages immortality in our society, 
especially among the youths. Our people may have a passion for ndombolo, but I 
think it was a wise decision to ban it.” 
The third move, and the one that upset the public most, was the institution 
of a weekly talk show called Deviance, hosted by Mendo Ze himself. Deviance 
tackled topics such as proper aspects of cultural production such as singing and 
dancing, and the ways people should behave in society, in public and in 
administration.  Dress was particularly stressed; foreign media was decried, 
especially the so-called “bordello-culture” of the French; of course bikutsi came 
under fire frequently.  
Interestingly, the program was inherently suspect from a public 
standpoint, as it was deemed improper for a person of Mendo Zé’s stature, age 
and position to be directing a program of such nature (Bingono: interview).  
According to public sentiment and cultural convention, the host should have been 
an anthropologist or sociologist, or even some type of civil servant.  More to the 
point, the words to a popular song at the time called “Deviance” proclaimed that 
“there are some words that should not appear from the mouth of an elder, a figure 
of respect.” 
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The backlash to the media ban on foreign music and video made it 
apparent that no one was being taken in by the media’s political diversion. A 
notable singer at the time, Mpande Star said, “Let’s not fool ourselves. Those who 
complain that ndombolo is immoral are lazy musicians afraid of competition.”  
The private press was unanimous in its condemnation as well, decrying the ban as 
merely yielding to laziness and encouraging mediocrity. For many, the ban simply 
amounted to cultural censorship, or another expression of the totalitarian nature of 
the system. 
Rather I suggest reading these maneuvers by the government and media as 
reactionary tactics safeguarding their lifestyle and power, as well as taking 
umbrage to the media developing in ways unpredictable and uncontrollable. If we 
look closely, at least to the bikutsi element, we find that criticism, obscenity, and 
the notion of female power had been there from the very beginning. And while 
some have lamented the passage of “the oblique and suggestive approach,” 
postcolonial feminist theory creates space for this so-called transgressive behavior 
(Suleri 1992). In the political anxiety that modernizing nations exhibit to prove 
their traditional culture remains intact, national rhetoric often calls upon women 
to be the bearer and transmitter of culture and tradition. Men in these instances 
have the ability to move across spheres of influence, negotiating the modern and 
the traditional as need dictates. Regressive policies such as those enacted by the 
CRTV limit this ability for women.   
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Excluded from the social administration, Beti women find in bikutsi a 
privileged way of expression, as it allies creativity, poetry and musical 
expressiveness in defining their own space and voice. Women write their 
lyrics spontaneously with a particular sense of precision. One at the time 
they dance in the middle of a circle, teasing and encouraging each other. 
They take inspiration from true topics and they receive congratulations for 
the richness, the truth and the rhymes of their verse.  (Noah).  
 
 
 In discussing the sexualized nature of language, various feminist theorists 
have started from the premise that language structures themselves are gendered by 
nature. Thus entering into the world is to enter into a structure of language and 
being that has already assigned meaning to expressive modes. Theorizing female 
sexuality and subjectivity, for example, both Cixous and Irigaray contend that the 
world is divided into series of binaries—male/female, language/silence, self/other. 
These binaries operate within systems of valuations in which the masculine is 
granted a privilege and power that extend as well to the phallo-centricity and 
logo-centricity of Western thought and knowledge production. Thus, phallogo-
centricity devalues female modes of expression, recognizing the masculine as the 
Self while creating the feminine Other (Cixous 1975, Irigaray 1977). 
 This repeated othering creates a scenario in which the female and the 
feminine are considered in terms of their derivation from the male center. This act 
appears as naturalized so that masculinist discourses are taken as normative. 
However, both Cixous and Irigiray note that female expressive modes and 
sexuality are not identical to male expression, sexuality or language.  
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 If language is not gender neutral but is instead part of masculinist 
discourse, perhaps there exists a feminine language that resonates with feminine 
modes of expression. This would not resemble normative masculinist language 
systems, but rather rejects Western philosophical traditions of universal 
subjecthood. Instead what emerges is a theory of difference in which female 
expression and sexuality is posited not in contrast to normative systems, but as 
positive and independently valued.  
 It is possible to note the gendering and sexualization of language 
structures in the work of K-tino, and while it could be argued that her usage of 
masculinist discourses, systems of language and appropriation of globalized 
symbols of female sexuality impinges on her transgressive nature, a more 
productive reading shows her challenging power structures in significant ways. 
The re-signification of a “masculine” media system is one such result. If we argue 
that K-tino does not create a feminine expressive style, autonomous from 
masculinist discourses of power, but instead presents an emergent feminine style, 
we might re-formulate the concept of the feminine and its relationship to the 
masculine itself.  
 Her performances of sexuality contain knowledge of the public discourse 
surrounding the female body, as evidenced in the manner in which she provokes 
both male and female dancers in her videos. Here she acts as a social critic, 
moving between masculine and feminine sexuality and allowing her body to 
perform sexual aggression as both pursuer and receiver. K-tino’s performances 
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contribute to the realization of a female subjectivity by deconstructing typified 
female public sexuality and by claiming global erotic symbols of the female body. 
In fact, she performs not a reflection of female othering so much as an 
appropriation and re-performance of these symbols. In her performances, K-tino 
demonstrates a control and awareness of not only her erotic body, but also an 
awareness of the reaction in the critique she encounters.  
 She says, “If I am vulgar, than Ewondo is vulgar,” revealing the way in 
which language works as a socialization tool, and more relevant to our discussion, 
how Beti women have historically utilized singing to manipulate masculinist 
language structures into powerful transformative spaces. Ultimately, this shows 
that if phallo-centric language structures are perhaps inherently repressive, and 
women’s voices have been continuously marginalized, female expression is still 
not determined by the systems in which they are located. Instead, K-tino 
demonstrates a female expression constantly developed though performance. She 
finds innovative ways to critique existing power structures by addressing their 
sexuality and subjectivity, and by manipulating both media and language. 
 K-Tino’s music highlights the significance of tradition in women’s 
musical expression over time and beyond urban/rural, modern/traditional binaries. 
In a previous form, bikutsi served as an erotic socialization process among 
women. Although the space in which K-Tino operates is more “public” and the 
manipulation of the media and inclusion of erotic physical movements creates a 
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seeming disjuncture between the two musics, I would argue that a careful 
listening of her music shows a creative transformation of tradition.  
 This is especially significant in understanding women’s music making in 
an African landscape in which modernity and its products are often assigned 
exclusively to men. This accounts for much of the critique and backlash against 
modern bikutsi as the deviation and degeneration of traditional culture. In this 
conception men have access to participate in modernity while women are 
assigned the realm of tradition. This allows men to control women’s access to 
expression, critique, and ownership of their sexuality and their bodies. Female 
bikutsi musicians such as K-Tino are showing that not only do they have access to 
modernity through manipulation of the media, appropriation of globalized erotic 
signs, and willful neglect of traditional feminine roles, they have in fact always 
had the ability to participate in what those in power had strived to deny them.  
If bikutsi has always been about creating space and voice, then in the new 
media landscape of Cameroon, the voices choose to be louder, and often share in, 
as well as mock the tastes and habits of the men in power. For instance, popular 
rumor often refers to Mendo Ze, a committed Catholic and mariologue (follower 
of the Virgin Mary) rather as serpentologue (a Rosicrucian whose mystical totem 
is a boa constrictor). It has been said that Ze gains and maintains his power by 
sucking the menstrual blood of young virgins whom he entices with gifts of 
money and jewelry, usually in the form of a gold snake necklace. Mbembe writes, 
“Men in power at different levels of society are represented as men consumed by 
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phallocratic passions, and they are ridiculed and debased by the girls and women 
they often imagine themselves to be debasing.  The rebellious chants show the 
political dimension of the cultural creativity of Cameroonian women… the revolt 
and the rupture is expressed in song” (Mbembe 2001: 127).  I maintain the recent 
developments of bikutsi fall under this paradigm, as an attempt by performing 
women to re-establish that critical voice and direct it perhaps derisively, perhaps 
obscenely, at those on top.   
Essono wrote that “nowadays men as well as women sing bikutsi and their 
message stays the same. Nowadays they speak clearly to the power; they claim 
their rights, say their deceptions and sorrows for the future of their children, 
complain about corruption” (Essono 1996: 54). The traditional themes of love and 
sexuality, feminine strength, family and life education continue to be dominant in 
contemporary bikutsi, though the stylistic liberties in language, dance and visual 
imagery have expanded to fill the media space it inhabits.   
 But in the face of overwhelming Beti modesty and shame, the question of 
obscenity remains.  Coming back to Baudrillard, he wrote that obscenity begins 
when there is no more spectacle, no more stage, theatre or illusion. Thus, only 
when everything becomes immediately transparent, visible, and exposed in the 
raw inexorable light of information and communication do we confront the 
obscene. If this is true, then the truly obscene can only happen when there is no 
more illusion to the exercise of power, when we can see it for all its 
exhibitionism.  If both the public and private space are disintegrating, that is, the 
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body, the landscape and time as a stage are disappearing, then the truly obscene, 
as he says, occurs when “the most intimate operation of your life becomes the 
potential grazing ground of the media.”  The obscene then no longer contains a 







Revisiting the Local Record Industry: 
 







 This chapter is the result of a now on-going project in Cameroon, a US 
State Department invitation to participate in their Cultural Envoy Program in 
2006. During my fieldwork I was approached by the Embassy Cultural Affairs 
Section and asked if there was something we might be able to contribute to the 
music community. What might be of use to the music industry in Cameroon? 
Information. And software. And training. I related the concerns and needs of 
everyone I had met in the music community during my previous year of 
fieldwork. Those needs were, in short, digital recording technology. The demand 
for information, recording software training, and indeed the hardware itself, led to 
a US government funded project of building and installing a digital recording 
studio in Yaoundé, in the cultural center called Africréa. It would eventually come 
to be overseen by a local arts commission and available to the general music 
community, at minimal operating costs. 
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Figure 23: Africréa before 
 
 Working with a group of young desktop engineers and producers 
introduced me to a number of interesting developments at the time, and led me to 
re-visit the formidable Music in Small Countries project undertaken by Krister 
Malm and Roger Wallis in the 1970s and 80s (Wallis and Malm 1984, 1993). 
More specifically, I was interested in the exploration of government media 
policies and how they influence the struggle between foreign media content vs. 
local music activity. As they point out, all too often local politicians seem content 
to sit on the fence and “wait and see what happens,” while technological and 






Figures 24-25:  Studio Nyanga after 
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The original project, Big Sounds from Small Peoples, charted the flow of 
music industry technology and products to virtually every corner of the globe, 
observing some of the ways in which this development assisted or came into 
conflict with national and local cultural interests. As they found in the 1970s, the 
problems faced by cultural policymakers were mainly concerned with the 
availability of music industry technology and the uses to which it was put. One of 
the fallouts was that those who cannot keep up with technological developments 
in primary music mass media run the risk of being excluded from secondary 
sources.  
However, what I found in Cameroon seemed to entirely precede those 
findings, or even the argument itself. Instead, the questions in Cameroon fell more 
along the lines of, What happens when the possibility of local content disappears 
altogether? or What of a government cultural policy that neglects the music and 
recording industry until it barely exists? and How do you survive as an artist if 
more than 90% of record sales are of the pirated variety? Despite the fact that I 
was asking these questions thirty years later, I felt that the position of the music 
industry was perhaps at a pre-1970s level. Indeed, as I was to discover, not only 
had the recording and music industry died of utter neglect, but in some 
spectacular cases, it was done in by a blunt object. Still, in the end there are a few 
people finding ways to get things done, and mostly on their own terms. And that 
is where this story begins.  
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Using the example of the then newly-formed independent co-operative 
Culture Mboa Collectif, I demonstrate a model for contemporary art that 
contaminates the present day domains of both art and politics. Mboa and its 
founder Ruben Binam have developed a union of musicians and technicians that, 
for the first time in Cameroon, owns and oversees every aspect of production, 
from recording and design to distribution. This dynamic contests the 
government’s control and discourse of the music industry and its recent decline, 
as well as its tacit complicity with the pirate music market.  
Concurrently, recent music scholarship and press in Cameroon have noted 
the increase in protest songs leading to the convergence of popular music and 
popular causes, without the allure, or even possibility of political patronage. I 
argue that it is the new media and technologies such as digital recording and 
duplication that allow a generation of cultural practitioners a multiplicity of what 
Michel Gaillot refers to as “elective communities,” which no longer rely on a 
factual belonging to state, nation, or ideology (Gaillot 1998: 42). According to 
Gaillot, these Do-it-Yourself, cultural youth formations are “passional” 
communities that assert control over an array of technologies and media, 
variously establishing a liberated space motivated by ethics and standards of 
social justice. 
Cameroon’s media-scape has undergone dynamic and for some, unsettling 
changes in recent years.  The state-controlled audio-visual sector, which has been 
absolute since its inception in 1986, has gradually loosened to allow private radio 
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since 2000, along with a few fledgling television concerns since 2005.   Although 
in principle, private radio and television have been allowed by law since 1990, as 
of yet no licenses have been issued, thus leaving the door open to government 
harassment and in some cases violence. I had the odd phone conversation one 
morning with Pius Njawe, the celebrated newspaper publisher, radio broadcaster 
and self-proclaimed freedom fighter. He was sorry he had to cancel our interview 
that afternoon. Unfortunately, gendarmes had locked his radio station down and 
were currently trying to burn it. I told him I understood.  
As the Cameroonian media undergoes a process of democratization highly 
influenced by foreign media and government, local musicians and video artists 
have become actors in a conflicted and uncertain environment.  On the one hand 
are issues of nation-building and cultural development in the face of dominant 
foreign media, and on the other, the multitude of images, sounds and forms of 
popular culture that people attach themselves to in their daily imaginings.  
In its heyday in the 1980s, the Cameroon National Radio Studio produced 
more than 40 albums a year, however the German-donated equipment there has 
long ceased functioning. Today there exists one demo-quality recording studio in 
Douala, and none in the capital city of Yaoundé. The studio is owned by the 
wealthy son of a prominent government minister, and it takes a considerable 
amount of patronage, or high-level influence to gain access there. There are 2 CD 
duplication centers in Douala, though most artists are hesitant to use them because 
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of their inferior quality, and for the universal fear that they are in fact the heart of 
the pirate music industry. 
On the retail end, only one legitimate, and by that I mean government-
sanctioned, royalty supported record store operates in Yaoundé, MCPoP. It sells 
legal CDs, government stamped by the Cameroon Music Corporation (previously 
SOCIDRA, SOCINADA, now SOCAM) for anywhere from 13 to 18 dollars, 
which is beyond the budget of most Cameroonians. And it is locally understood 
that even though the store works in conjunction with the CMC, it also sells 
pirated, though stamped, copies of CDs as well. Meanwhile, the market stalls and 
hawkers selling pirated copies of albums (99-song mixes for 50 cents to a dollar), 
service what market there is for popular music across Cameroon, just as in many 
west and central African countries.  
In many ways this is a story of the continuing struggle to wrest control of 
the artistic process, as well as ownership of the artwork and profits of its sale. 
Lack of studio facilities, duplication, distribution and sales points make it nearly 
impossible to create anything of value, or have that value realized in spite of the 
piracy and corruption. Securing what means exist often involves finding a 
producer who will cover expenses, but always at the cost of copyright, back-end 
costs, and extortion fees. And as I unhappily discovered, in the case of female 
artists, there is often the implied expectation of sexual exchange.  
Unfortunately the Cameroon Music Corporation, which handles artists 
rights and royalties, and charges for each cassette and CD stamp, as well as artist 
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membership dues, has no way to account for music or video diffusion. And every 
few years their license is inevitably revoked and they’re shut down by the 
government and restructured for reasons of corruption, mismanagement or 
embezzling. But of course by that time, the allotted budget has “been 
disappeared.” As Ruben Binam explained it in interview, “the CMC operates like 
the sort of patron society that is created in a lot of places in Africa. You get 
nothing until you need something, and then you get a little bit by asking for it. As 
far as regulated work exchange value, that doesn’t really exist.”  
Of course this is just another reference to what Bayart has termed the Big 
Man complex in Africa, or politics of the belly (Bayart 1993). It is not uncommon 
for the big man to be influenced by the ethos of munificence, or to make a point 
of honor in doing so. However, it is more common for generosity to be imposed 
upon him by kinship, flattery or the accusations of witchcraft. In this way, the 
small men work a form of political innovation that insures the redistribution of 
wealth. Binam says, “As long as a little money falls down, everybody’s going to 
be happy. If the money stops coming down, then you have jealousy and insecurity 
and resentment. But that is not the way these businesses are supposed to operate.” 
 
Macase (my house) 
 
The story of Culture Mboa actually begins in 1998 when Ruben Binam 
started the popular band called Macase. They played a mix of local styles 
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including bikutsi, assiko and makossa, and had a very smooth polished style after 
their Cameroonian heroes Richard Bona and Sally Nyolo. After achieving a 
relative degree of local success, they sought out noted musician and radio 
executive Sam Mbende to produce the band. Mbende recorded their first CD, but 
immediately after got sidetracked with his own highly successful career, a record 
release and a radio show. Not sensing any immediate payback, he promptly lost 
interest in the band and ignored their development. At the same time however, he 




Figure 26: Macase at rehearsal 
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At some point, Mbende’s disinterest and Macase’s dissatisfaction 
prompted both parties to come to a mutual agreement for terminating the contract, 
and Macase then took it upon themselves to promote the band and continue 
touring on their own. By 2001, they were arguably the biggest act in Cameroon, 
and the group was selected for the MASA (Arts and Spectacles Marketing) 
Festival in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, where they eventually won a professional 
demo recording session, along with sizable amount of prize money. The demo 
was a surprise to everyone, and was in turn sent to Radio France International, 
where it won the RFI World Music Discoveries Award. This prize came with a 
Paris recording contract and a major European tour. They were now an 
unqualified success.  
Unfortunately, Sam Mbende came to realize how lucrative the band was 
becoming. He denied ever receiving the contract termination papers (impossible 
to prove), and brought legal action against RFI, demanding some 50,000 (US) 
dollars in management fees if RFI were to continue to work with the group. Of 
course, in by now a somewhat familiar story, RFI instead promptly dumped the 
band, rescinded the prize money, and effectively ended whatever career 
momentum Macase had built up to that point outside of Cameroon. They returned 
home broken and with only a new set of equipment to show for it.  
Mbende, meanwhile, in an absolutely devious stroke, had invoked a 
renewal clause buried in their contract and completely unknown to the band. He 
spent the next 3 years extorting performance money from the band until they 
 120 
could buy their way out of their contract for $16,000 (he eventually settled for 
$8,000).  
   
A postnote to this story, and what can only be considered a tragic irony: Sam 
Mbende in 2005 became the president of the CMC, thus becoming the single voice 
effectively in charge of overseeing the legal rights, financial interests and 






While rebuilding the band’s reputation in the following years, Binam 
dedicated himself to the idea of Culture Mboa as a way of gathering into a 
collective all the forces the artistic community would need to remain beyond the 
reach of the government’s influence, as well as corrupt producers and pirates. Key 
to this notion, and the principle upon which Mboa was built, is the ideal of 
fostering an artist’s career. If nothing else, Macase and Mbende had taught 
everyone an unforgettable lesson.   
Culture Mboa is a partnership that exists between Ruben Binam, who runs 
a secretive but highly effective digital garage studio in Yaoundé, and Emanuel 
Wandji, a Cameroonian producer who lives in Paris. Binam decides which of the 
available roster is ready for recording, handles the production, recording and 
mixes the CD, and sends the files to Wandji Paris, who designs the artwork and 
has the CDs printed in Hong Kong. The quality is somewhat high and the 
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possibility of pirated copies getting back to Cameroon is very low. Binam then 
handles the distribution through custom-designed kiosks around Yaoundé and 
Douala. These mostly exist in larger, Western style supermarkets and cabarets. 
Though not a dollar, the discs sell for a reasonable eight dollars, with Mboa 
currently averaging over 100 sales a month. That money is strictly accounted for, 
and minus production costs (again, minimal) goes straight back to the artist.  
 One stipulation is that every artist part of the concern must be available to 
promote the project, and participate in public education against piracy and 
corruption. There are sample video spots that played on local television with the 
artists imploring Cameroonians to support the musicians and not purchase pirate 
CDs. As Binam says, “It’s a movement. It’s not a label just for commercial aims. 
The organizers are artists who need other artists to be with them, to make 
something different, to build a project, to lead a project, and to make it live.” To 
that end, the Cultural Mboa manifesto proposes 4 main objectives: to valorize the 
work of artists and give it adequate visibility, to inform and educate the public of 
the misdeeds of piracy, to promote the live appearances of the artists, and to 





Figure 27: Mboa manifesto 
 
 
The crux here is an understanding of something greater beyond the scope 
of capital, perhaps a “structure of feeling” as Raymond Williams called it. Binam 
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is obviously passionate, which is a small wonder considering all the 
disappointment:  
 
I need to do something concerning African music. I need to try to make 
things change. I’m talking about the technical conditions of working, the 
way artists are considered inside the country and outside, because they 
don’t consider our work as normal work. They consider that when you are 
an artist, you do nothing. You are doing nothing useful for the society. And 
that’s why Culture Mboa. We need to be recognized and we need to work 
here and we need to live here, normally, just as somebody who is a 
banker; just as somebody who is a lawyer, just as somebody who sells 
tomatoes in the market. 
 
 
Beyond the practicalities of production and consumption, I argue that 
Culture Mboa realize a greater existence among the artistic community in 
Cameroon, and perhaps serve as a model for other developing, or more 
importantly, exhausted record industries. The abilities of digital technology, and 
the obligation to resuscitate the artistic image and livelihood of Cameroonian 
musicians give Mboa and others who follow them the opportunity for alliances 
woven, as Gaillot says, “beyond the level of communities of fact and obligation.” 
This leads to what he calls “elective communities,” and makes for the most open 
and free communities possible: that is, non-prescriptive and non-coerced, where 
ethnic, racial, religious, and political determinations are mixed and suspended 
(Gaillot 1998: 42).  
Here what was once private, such as taste and feeling, becomes public and 
the ground for being-together, just as what was public or social, such as the 
religious, the racial, or the ethnic, tends instead to become private. We then 
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witness the emergence of smaller communities based on extremely fluid ties, and 
temporarily articulated around freely shared passions or feelings.  
This line of thinking is not necessarily new, of course. There is the spectre 
of it in Bourdieu’s notion of communitas. While Benedict Anderson’s “imagined 
community” seems to be a likely precedent (Anderson 1983). However I would 
maintain that Anderson’s conception relies on a by-now outmoded sense of 
nationalism (bankrupt) in Africa. More importantly, it is helpful to envision the 
imagined community as one at least as effective across spaces with the unknown, 
or taken on faith. I liken the elective community as a more contiguous entity, with 
an efficacious intimacy.  
Perhaps what comes closest is Weber’s notion of “elective affinities,” 
though was rather amorphous about its intricacies. Howe has speculated it 
according to “mechanistic causalism,” while stating that despite its value-free 
stance, the elective affinity of similar ideal sill allow the circle of its contributors 
to hold together and to recruit new members” (Howe 1978: 366). For Weber, who 
confronted the chaos of the world, there existed an order for the actor in history 
and that affected history’s course. Thus the logic of history would be the logic of 
the elective affinities. I would argue that what is happening in Cameroon, more 
practically on the civil society scale than anything, has only the power to disrupt 
any such logic to history, and on a micro scale, a pinpoint moment.  
What is important for situations such as Culture Mboa lies in the ability 
not only to mix and cross-breed sources of information like sounds, visuals and 
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text, but to make anyone into not only a receiver, but a creator and a transmitter. 
If we consider a lack of possible emancipatory effect except through technology, 
the latter is real and effective only when it is shared and democratized; it can no 
longer remain a matter for specialists or technicians. It is the interactivity between 
man and machine that creates the possibility of no longer remaining a spectator. 
To go back to McLuhan, those who select and control information determine the 
figuration of the work and of our existence.  
Although I’m hesitant to extend this idea too far, as Maffesoli transmits 
this type of temporary sociability farther into fete (Maffesoli 1993), it does add an 
interesting sub-text to Achille Mbembe’s inversion of the carnivalesque in 
analyzing the Cameroonian power structure. This space often overlaps with that 
of the elite or governing class in an intimacy, almost a complicity we might say, 
that turns power and play into everyday performance. 
 One perhaps unexpected result of this convergence of alliances, especially 
between the independent record producers and the independently developing 
media, is the proliferation of protest songs. Cameroonian media critic Francis 
Nyamnjoh has written of the emergence of makossa artists such as the venerable 
Lapiro de Mbanga, whose songs employ Pidgin English lyrics to signify the 
personal and collective experiences of the common people, and whose current 
songs reproach the government of President Paul Biya for its growing corruption 
and inability to change the status quo (Nyamnjoh 2005: 265). 
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Figure 28: The power of language 
 
As well, recent press, such as the BBC news online (Dec 2007) has 
chronicled a burgeoning new style focused specifically on anti-corruption called 
“revolutionary song.” Popular artists such as Longue Longue sing lyrics such as, 
“Biya, you promised change, but what do you want to change, the tax money you 
are swindling, or the constitution?” They demand in these songs that specific 
ministers be sent directly to Kondengui prison, and infamous detention center in 
Yaoundé. And while the practice of protest singing is not necessary new to 
Cameroon—for instance traditional bikutsi artists from the village have always 
had a relative degree of freedom of speech in society—it was only after the advent 
of independent production and non-governmental media that artists began to sing 
with impunity against the regime in the name of democracy.  
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If this new digital wave is one in which technology no longer alienates, 
but instead offers the possibility of a revised sense of gemeinschaft—and by this I 
mean a shared set of common beliefs, concentrated ties and frequent interactions 
at a distance from a power center—then the recent phenomenon of digital music 
collectives in Cameroon promises greater connivance, complicity and 
convergence between popular music and popular causes. 
  Here the interaction between the recording industry, the political system 
that has previously owned it, and the popular music it helps produce aptly shows 
how the conscious use of technology and the media are ways of maximizing the 
possibilities that represent the sphere of music performance, allowing for a more 
total saturation, and indeed an overflow, of the usual limits of production and 
reception. 
Binam, perhaps, puts it best:  
 
Another reason is the context. Art is not considered as having an 
economic power. Perhaps it’s time for us to work and to consider that we 
can get into the world market through the quality of our production and 
artistic projects. Perhaps it may be a way of starting this process; trying 
to be known outside of Africa and outside the country; trying to sell 
something outside of Cameroon. Perhaps it will make it possible to live in 
our own country, and have this credibility. That’s what I think and that’s 




Figure 29:  Binam at work in the garage 
 
Cameroonian government declarations have often stressed the importance 
of government media in the attainment of cultural, economic and political 
development objectives.  However, I maintain it is the digitally savvy and media-
enabled youth that will play a leading role in disseminating information and 
mobilizing Cameroonians toward self-reliance, autonomy and independence in 
economic, cultural and political matters, leaving behind what local sidewalk radio 










Pour La Transparence: the CMC, the African Media Federation and the  
 





 Even before I had a real chance to settle into Cameroon--in fact I was still 
sleeping on Ahanda's couch--the entirety of the country's musical world was 
summoned to the Palais de Congrès for the re-formation of the Cameroon Music 
Corporation, or CMC, and voting in of a new president. The CMC had been 
defunct for over a year, the previous incarnation having collapsed under the 
direction of Manu Dibango, who oversaw operations from Brussels. Somehow, 
his budget had disappeared, and the musicians were no longer able to secure what 
little royalties that might have been available.  
 The idea of having someone protecting artist rights from overseas struck 
me as odd, until I learned that royalties, or droits voisin, didn't necessarily come 
from legitimate sources. Instead, in typical "big man" fashion, a budget was 
accrued, and money was trickled down as an artist might need, or apply for. 
Actual record sales or playback accounting didn't occur. In fact, before there was 
the CMC, there was SOCIDRA, and before that SOCINADA, and before that the 
Committee for Artistic Rights, and all followed the same pattern. The government 
grants a budget to a director, the budget disappears, and sooner or later the society 
is folded. Now I understood Dibango as having a vantage from overseas, as to be 
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able to secure more funds from abroad, acting as more of a development director 
than someone who was looking out for the legal and financial rights of the music 
community. 
 What followed that day was one of the more perverse demonstrations of 
Roberts Rules than I could have imagined, lasting from 7am to somewhere after 
10pm. After 15 hours of debate, no vote was ever taken, however there was a 
president and a board, and the CMC was back in business. Obviously there were 
more forces at work here than I imagined, besides ostensibly electing a new 
director who had apparently been pre-ordained.  
 This chapter will briefly examine two conferences, the CMC at the 
beginning of my work and sponsored by the Cameroonian government, and the 
Inter-African Media Federation, which took place in Douala and was sponsored 
by the United States government. In each case, what was expected to happen on 
the surface apparently never did happen, and yet something definitely got 
accomplished. However the failure of both governments’ ability to engender a 
culture of organization, perhaps without fear of the preternatural accumulation of 
power and wealth, presents a startling similarity.  
 Dominic Thomas presents a good starting point in his discussion of 
national conferences in Francophone Africa. He calls them a "unique forum for 
discussion in their objective of creating a more inclusive discursive site, one that 
would incorporate a broad range of voices in the process of defining and even 
imagining the country's trajectory" (Thomas 2002: 163). For him, conferences 
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have the ability to delineate parameters of reform, confront the past, and a 
dialogue and ritual for restoration. These would have seemed apt criteria for the 
re-formation of the CMC. And yet, one questions if necessary reform or 
restoration had actually taken place.  
 The event was obviously thought to be important. Every name musician in 
the country had driven into Yaoundé for the event. I saw and met every 
Cameroonian artist I had ever heard of, and had pictures taken with Bebe Manga, 
who wrote the international hit "Ami O". It seemed a grand affair, and the first 
few hours were spent socializing in the lobby of the Palais. What was also 
happening was an intense politicking, however, with factions being drawn, 
alliances set, and strategies formed. The intrigue was building, and I was excited 
to see how the election would play out. Obviously Dibango hadn't taken care of 
business the way people had hoped. But there was optimism for a new era, one of 
transparency.  
   
 
In accordance with the statutes and the general payment, within the 
framework of its mission of recasting of the CMC and the adoption of its 
fundamental texts, the commission of revision of the texts sets up a mode 
of nonexhaustive indemnity, the purpose of which is to return 
transparency to all the activities of the board of trustees, of the regulatory 
commission and statutes issued by the extraordinary general meeting of 
recasting on 16 April 2005, to impel a new and dynamic orientation to the 
CMC. 





 Instead what happened was hours and hours of speeches, interspersed with 
readings from the statutes, followed by shouts of "Adopted!" Even the new 
budget was passed out. And finally came the time for voting new officers. First 
nominations were taken, and each nomination had to be accompanied by a sheet 
of 50 signatures of petition. An hour or two later, there were four parties, though 
one got disqualified for lack of sincerity, and another for not submitting 
signatures in the correct form.  
 Suddenly, t-shirts were being handed out with Sam Mbende's face on 
them, and the slogan "Pour la Transparence." Something seemed amiss. And amid 
the uproar, Mbende's people and the opposing party stepped out into the hall, and 
when they came back, Mbende was president of the new CMC. Somehow the 
opposition had been persuaded to step down. And while hundreds of musicians 






Figure 30: bikutsi musician with Sam Mbende's campaign shirt 
 
 
 And maybe that's the point. Thomas suggests a re-using of the notion of 
African palabre for its logo-therapeutic value. That is, simply to participate 
already constitutes an implicit commitment and consent ahead of time to 
conciliation. He writes that "the National Conference constituted a contemporary 
manifestation of an organized palabre, providing the opportunity for multiple 
oratorical encounters...through the staging of dialogue, it has the capacity to 
promise, engage, and allow for reintegration rather than exclusion" (Thomas 
2002: 167).  
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 However, Nyamnjoh's work on development narratives and witchcraft 
offers a more nuanced reading that involves what is referred to as the visible as 
well as the invisible. He suggests that even the most Afrocentric descriptions or 
models of analysis explicitly or implicitly refer to categories and conceptual 
systems that depend on a western epistemological order, as if African 
weltanschauung and African traditional system of thought are unthinkable.  
 For him, the multi-dimensionality in Cameroon has equal space for all the 
senses, as well as the invisible, the emotional and the sentimental. According to 
Nyamnjoh,  
 
"western discourses on development and democracy tend to recognize 
individuals and nations sates as real, but either ignore the existence of 
intermediate communities, or treat them as backsliding on the long march 
toward modernity. Traditional Africans see and treat the individual as a 
child of the community, allowed to pursue needs but not greed. Agency 
has meaning only as domesticated agency" (Nyamnjoh 2005: 31).  
 
 
 A powerful person is one who can convince others that he or she controls 
a complex array of visible or invisible forces. Conversely, a person known to have 
political power is presumed also to have power over the spirit world. As well, he 
points out that, although most studies of witchcraft have excluded the cities and 
towns, cosmopolitan Africans pretend to be rationalist in public but indigenous in 
private.  
 And I can attest to that fact. One Sunday morning, Jean-Marie called and 
asked me to come take him to his studio. When I arrived at his corner, he was 
standing on the street with some flowers. "We need to make a stop," and he 
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seemed very quiet, so I didn't ask. He directed me high above the city, to a 
cemetery behind a large Catholic church. Indeed, his teenage son was buried 
there, and it was birthday. I admit being at a loss for the amount of intimacy the 
moment contained. We had never discussed anything but music, politics and 
soccer. And now I was to spend the morning with him at his son's graveside. I sat 
in silence, but eventually he said the boy had loved to play basketball. Finally, I 
asked how he had died. Apparently his heart gave out suddenly. I must have 
looked confused. And then a longer explanation ensued. His grandmother was a 
well-known and very power woman in the Catholic church, and in fact, a 
Rosicrucian as well. I knew that in Cameroon secret societies such as 
Rosicrucians and Freemasons are assumed to have connections with the occult. 
And it was said that the boy's grandmother had made a terrible sort of deal to gain 
her great power and influence, and a diviner had told JM that eventually it would 
cost the boy his life. It was impossible to deny his belief in this.  
 Practice of witchcraft in these circumstances is tied to a reformulation of 
market economy termed moral economy, a sort of zero-sum universe in 
Cameroonian reckoning. The term moral economy as we have come to understand 
it represents an alternative to the concept of market rationality and its 
encompassing discourse of modernization.  Originally coined by Edward 
Thompson in his 1960s writing on the eighteenth century food riots in Britain, 
moral economy is seen in its broadest sense as a form of social protest or direct 
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popular action, especially with a community being informed by the belief that 
they are defending traditional rights or customs. 
Thus the moral economy should be understood as in dialectic tension with 
political market economies, whereas the values that marketing assumes are the 
affirmative role of consumption rather than abstention in life; the link of 
consumption with happiness, acceptance, and status; the importance of individual 
freedom as the lack of restraint; and the needlessness of denial and the 
acceptability of “instant” gratification (Brenkert 1998: 91).  What this assumes is 
the possibility that moral economy models serve only narrow regional and 
occupational groups at the expense of general welfare, a type of selfish localism 
or indeed negative utilitarianism. As we can see, moral economies are as much 
about the negotiation of power as about actual rights. 
In this sense, Austen is suggesting that markets may be embedded in other 
systems of hierarchy, distribution and value, such as the relationship between 
communal norms and externally centered market economies, and may be a useful 
tool for analyzing relationships between individual acquisitiveness and other 
forces, such as witchcraft.  Here witchcraft, or the use of preternatural power by 
one person to damage others (like the aforementioned fear of threat), involves the 
efficacy of accusation as a direct function of intimacy, i.e. the social relationships 
involved in accusations, such as between peers, kin, co-wives or the urban-village 
continuum.   
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For Cameroon, any mode of introduced capitalism must not only respect 
individualism, but also embed itself in recognized systems of order, where 
witchcraft idioms are in competition with the discourses of markets and 
modernization.  Bayart writes that it is not unheard of for a “big man,” influenced 
by the ethos of munificence, to make a point of honor of doing so.  However, it is 
more common for it to be imposed upon him by kinship, flatter or the accusations 
of witchcraft.  This returns us to the ‘politics of the belly.’  If wealth indicates a 
potential sign of being at one with the cosmos, then undeserved wealth that does 
not benefit others can be denounced as a sign of witchcraft.  Thus a man who 
“manages to make good without ensuring that his network share in his prosperity 
brings shame upon himself and acquires the reputation of ‘eating’ others in the 
invisible world” (Bayart 1993: 233).  In this way the ‘small men,’ working 
political innovation of their own, ensure the redistribution of wealth.   
Indeed Austen suggests that fears by newly emergent elites (and use of 
witchcraft) are common in times of economic transition. Unfortunately for 
Africans, as Austen points out, their immediate moral targets are other Africans, 
while they leave the European bases of power mystified to the point where they 
can only be avoided, not effectively invaded (Austen 2000: 98). 
 One evening I was to stop at the house of Professor Onguene, who had 
become one of my project advisors. I had come to respect his great knowledge of 
Beti cultural history, his love of music, and hatred of politics. He had spent a great 
deal of time lecturing in France, and his work was formidable. On that night his 
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daughter, a reporter for the CRTV, met me at the gate. You can't come in tonight. 
Let's go out instead. When I inquired after her father, she said he was upset, and 
that one of her aunts had come from the village to visit, unannounced. I thought 
that was nice, but she looked horrified. "That means she is up to mischief, and 
will make bad things happen," she explained. "My father doesn't trust her, and is 
making her sleep in the living room, away from the children. He wants to keep us 
safe." I was incredulous to hear this, especially about him. But she went on. 
"When relatives come unexpectedly, they need or want something, and make 
strange things happen. You have to watch them closely."  
 And while this might seem strange at first, Comaroff and Comaroff have 
suggested that urban elite are obsessed with witchcraft and the occult, especially 
in the context of globalized consumerism. As well, it has been pointed out that 
sorcery accusations usually occur between family members and is indicative of 
how much ordinary Cameroonians cherish the solidarity of domesticated agency 
and how ready they are to protect it from aggression and the harmful pursuit of 
persona success.  
 The question of how this reads into the notion of conference participation 
involves the contradiction between rhetoric of emancipation and empowerment of 
the individual and the reality of politics not being limited to the transparent as 
prescribed by liberal democracy. The following is an excerpt from a press release 
I was hired to write for the Fédération Africaine des Journalistes: 
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YAOUNDÉ, Cameroon, October 3, 2005 – African journalists have repeatedly 
called for a truly connected media organization. During the week of October 3, 
Akwa Palace in Douala, Cameroon will be the site of the first Central African 
planning sessions of the InterAfrican Press Federation. Building on last year’s 
organizational sessions in Conakry, Cotonou and Bamako, this conference will 
invite media members to organize, plan and create a functioning body that will 
foster regional media development for all francophone African countries. 
Radio, television, print and Internet professionals will come together for the first 
time to share problems, progress and opportunities. This effort is only the first 
step in promoting media advocacy and connectivity, and allowing channels for 
follow-on training. The aim is to broaden the scope of this endeavour to touch all 
African countries.  
The event officially opens October 3, at the Akwa Palace in Douala. Proceedings 
and planning sessions begin Monday morning and conclude Wednesday at noon 
by which time final documents should be adopted. Tentative discussion topics 
include barriers to honest journalism, standards and ethics codes, training 
requests, a bilingual web site, links to global media groups, and the ability to help 
journalists in difficulty.  
TOT (training the trainers) sessions begin Wednesday afternoon, and at this 
point the conference will be opened to all journalists interested in joining 
pedagogical exercises developed in part by the World Press Freedom Committee 
and International Center for Journalists.  All levels of media sophistication, from 
top decision makers to young members committed to the process of media 
democratization, will be welcomed to attend. 
By the close of the session, participants will have selected a steering committee, 
adopted planning documents and planned a web site. To that end, a web site has 
been developed and hosted in Washington D.C., to be launched during the 
conference and become the permanent site for the organization. The final 
documents should include mission and ethics statements reflecting a consensus 
of the participants involved. It is our overarching goal that this week serve as the 
foundation of a stronger African media that supports transparency, accountability, 
good governance, a strong civil society and future economic growth.  
Organizations participating in and providing varying levels of operational and 
financial support include the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the 
Council for the Community of Democracies (CCD), the International Center for 
Journalists (ICFJ), the World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC), the Society of 




 What strikes one is what Thomas referred to as a failure to question the 
assumption of media liberalisms as a Eurocentric construct. He suggested instead 
that media must develop along lines acceptable to African methodology, and 
include factors of literacy, audience, distribution and production. What I would 
add is the performative dimension of conferences.  
 
 




 Instead of proceeding according to Washington plans, everyone indeed 
had their own agenda, jockeying for their own country to be represented on the 
oversight committee, and distrustful of other factions and geographic locales. In 
fact, in the end it was decided that each section of the continent had to have their 
own office, in order that undue influence couldn't be enacted. And the president 
was chosen from Burkina Faso, thought to be a safer neutral choice. However, 
months later when he was offered a large grant to gather his committees to him, 
nothing was in fact heard from him.  
Again, this is an excerpt from a press release after the opening day:  
 
The conference was opened by Cameroon Minister of Communications Pierre 
Moukoko Mbonjo and American Ambassador Niels Marquardt. 
 
The participants heard Minister Moukoko welcomed them to what he referred to 
as a milestone in the history of Cameroon journalism.  
 
The Cameroonian Minister expressed pride in the advances made in press 
freedom in Cameroon, noting that it was especially significant that the conference 
was taking place in Cameroon. He expressed his appreciation to the U.S. 
Department of State for selecting Douala as the conference site.  
 
Professor Moukoko urged the delegates to address the following issues:  
 
• the strengthening the national association of journalists, as the foundation for a 
strong regional network.  
 
He called on the journalists in Africa to establish the rules for their own 
profession, so that the controversies involving the press would not be resolved by 
the courts, but by the profession itself. 
 
He expressed pride that Cameroon is finally preparing to issue license for private 









 It is interesting to note the remarks of Pierre Moukoko. It wasn't too long 
after this conference that a number of Cameroonian press journalists were jailed 
for objectionable content. As well, I had an interview with a radio station owner 
cancelled on morning of the appointment. It seems the gendarmes had chained his 
station shut and locked him out.  Finally, by the time I had left Cameroon, private 
licenses had yet to be issued for radio, though that hadn't stopped pirate stations 
from popping up.  
 According to Nyamnjoh, recent analyses have explained the resurgence of 
witchcraft beliefs in mysterious centers of accumulation in Cameroon and 
elsewhere in Africa, with the globalization of poverty, uncertainty, and anxiety 
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generated by consumer capitalism. It would seem that a more thorough 
understanding of witchcraft and occult practices in modern Africa will also give a 
more comprehensive understanding to how they have informed alternative 
appreciation of development or modernity on the continent.  
 Certainly the bizarre death of Zanzibar, one of the most beloved of all 
Cameroonian musicians did not escape this fate. Zanzibar, the wildly talented 
guitarist and co-founder of Les Têtes Brulée died of a suicide, according to 
official report, in a country where such a thing is virtually unheard of. But there 
are almost as many theories as there are people to tell them. The suicide was 
brought on by a spurned love affair with a girl from the Congo. He was poisoned 
by Jean-Marie Ahanda, who couldn't bear the idea of Zanzibar being a more 
popular front man in the band. He killed himself out of shame, rather than be 
blackmailed into an unwilling homosexual affair with a high-ranking French 
diplomat. And finally, Tino Baroza, he was done in by sorcery enacted on him by 
the other, lesser talented guitarists in the country. In the zero-sum universe, 
somebody who acquires wealth or good fortune has done so at the expense of 
others. "Those are made into zombies, or given to societies of sorcerers to work 









 Sunday nights at Club Ceto were my favorite time of the week. On that 
night, Beti women from all over Yaoundé converged in the tiny club for an 
evening of bikutsi played by a small acoustic mendzan orchestra, and sung by 
women whose repertoires were both old and expansive. Just as in past decades, 
men accompanied the singers on xylophones and percussion. However at Ceto it 
was the women who controlled the dance floor. And what few men patronized the 
club kept to the background. Here the women enjoyed a degree of freedom of 
dance and performance rarely seen in other public or social contexts. The songs 
texts were more risqué than I had heard elsewhere, and also more critical. The 
dancers more exuberant and outrageous, and the men that dared the floor were 
often playfully molested. It was the only time I witnessed a proudly "out" lesbian 
in a country were homosexuality is still considered immoral and is indeed illegal.  
 In spite of the popularity of this weekly event, it was the only one of its 
kind in Yaoundé or Douala, at least when I arrived in the country. By the time I 
had left a little over a year later, the situation had changed considerably. There 
were small mendzan events appearing unannounced in many quartiers. And in 
fact, cabarets in general were experiencing a renaissance of sorts, the most 
upscale of which started with mendzan in the evening. When the electric band 
performed at night, they started with a set of jazz and American pop and soul 
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standards. That was followed invariably by a set of makossa classics, and the 
night stretched into morning with bikutsi after bikutsi.  
 Obviously, economics and an influx of expendable wealth has to 
factor in the spate of new club openings. However, in my analysis, it certainly 
seems as if the then-current climate of media liberalization, indeed cargo playing 
out at a media level--the image as commodity--had to some degree enable the 
space and impetus for the renewed expression of culture and critique.  If the 
process of media liberalization has taken away the state media’s ability to enact 
the regime’s power of persuasion, the populace is left with a new type of cargo in 
the form of sounds and imagery to go along with the narrative of global consumer 
culture.  
 Since my departure in 2006, all has not played out in accordance with 
some utopian vision of Habermas' theory of the public sphere, which enables 
dialogue outside the realm of government or economy, and allows for an equal 
participation in the critical discourse. Consider the following:  
 Shortly before I left Cameroon, Blick Bassy, the lead singer of the band 
Macase, decided to quit the group and move to Paris, like so many aspiring 
musicians and artists before him. Recently he released an album, Léman, that has 
been critically well received and was reviewed on the August 8, 2009 edition of 
NPR's The World. Bassy worries that Africa is losing not only its own languages 
and traditions but also its own history. He says, "I am calling young people to go 
back to the land of history and to learn oral traditions we have there," Bassy says. 
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"We write our history by ourselves." Yet ironically, he, like Manu Dibango before 
him, has had to leave Cameroon behind in order to promote its local values.  
 In May of 2008, Sam Mbende, incumbent President of the Cameroon 
Music Corporation, was arrested by police for misappropriation of some 50 
thousand dollars paid by Les Brassieres du Cameroon. Shortly after his release by 
the government, Mbende was re-elected to another term as head of the CMC. In 
another bizarre twist, authorities had cleared most of the voting hall of musicians 
for lack of identification papers. Mbende was the only candidate present at the 
vote.  
 In February of 2009, Mendo Ze, for years the Director of the CRTV and 
the second most powerful man in Cameroon, was under indictment for 
embezzlement of up to $1.5 million. Long a favorite of President Biya, Ze has 
long been known to exhibit grand generosity on politicians and friends outside the 
realm of media. However, it is hard to imagine he is anything more than a 
political diversion for Biya.  
 In October of 2009, the government closed a private unlicensed radio 
station for broadcasting highly content highly critical of the government. Dementi 
FM had been on air for approximately six months, yet had not paid the $100,000 
deposit for broadcasting license to ensure "administrative tolerance." Dementi's 
associated newspaper was shut down immediately following.  
  Another anecdote illustrates the difficulties extant. I worked briefly with a 
young television host from STV-Douala named Tito. Tito was the image of 
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modern African youth--short dreads, hip hop designer clothes, perfect rap. He was 
in charge of the under-20 demographic cultural programming, and had a passion 
and a vision for the future of television, political activism and the next 
Cameroonian generation. However, even though STV had a Senegalese manager 
and foreign financial backing, he expressed to me his countless frustrations and 
inability to enact any meaningful change in the way media was utilized at the 
administrative level. For him it was Cameroonian business as usual, and he 
expressed this most vividly in a rather performative and infamous "letter-to-the-






les symptômes Meurtriers le Rêve Défaillant Virused Dream 
 
 
It began pretty well… 
It had all it takes to start an extremely ambitious company, one with the intention to 
“communicate,” one who would forecast on habits, one who would be the long awaited 
mirror to the then regime-opinioned station, that fatted of just living in the screen boxes 
of 16 million...people.  
One that would be an alternative to a boring, no! Extremely sleeping-pill-effect TV. One 
that would promote an under looked culture, one that would brighten the darkened 
portion of this sector, that selfishly discriminates from its growing talents, to weigh on 
magnifying petty political issues, the same sector that bores itself to un-actual matters, 
too busy in its soliloquy to self-convincingly sound activist, forgetting once more that 
like the youth of neighboring Nigeria, we have our heroes, born to fight-type-youths, 
teenagers making statements and rallying energy to change significant situations in their 
respective communities… 
Yes…it was an appraisable effort, intention, ambition, strive, you name it, as you would 
have it sound, to be…Different. 
 
If you would consider The power of Difference and the legitimate analysis that puts this 
word at the origin of most if not all bright ideas of all centuries after Christ…then 




Canvassing recognition or a favorable opinion from a primitive, brainwashed, cowardly 
and skeptical population (and I must inform you, the Dream carries national and even 
international notes…), is a very delicate operation.  
You need the right power, which measures up to how much provisions you can boast of, 
already in store for the undoubtedly long journey; In business terms, I heard they call it 
“capital…” 
 
With headquarters in the economic capital (…follow me…), this huge capital would 
provide to-be homes, cables, lenses, speakers, microphones, chips and microchips that 
would earn the project an eye raising accompanied “wow what a sophisticated 
technological investment and equipment…!”, from the bluffed partakers or still to be 
partners, clients to and in the “gigantic” project.  
Yes our Alpha-capital!...Would provide roof, food, and per diem…(no!, call it a gesture 
since that is how his philanthropic engagement to scoring this seemingly easy—
penalty—project has been described), for the HAIC (Head African In Charge). A 
modest gesture of a little less or more (…for man no de Know…) than a dozen seven 
digits cfa.  
 
That HAIC, like I have chosen to call him, would then in “collabo” (an often used word 
in the “to-some-homes” premises) with the “Superheads”, “pick” in what you would 
agree given the pedigree of the toppers here, be a highly complex and selective process, 
those who would execute and make real a Dream promised to 16 million in its genesis 
and over 65 countries from the 5 earthly continents… 
 
…Hey, this is how big this thing is and I’m not even kidding…! 
 
That pick was definitely a pick…! 
 
A pick in which power-diggers, lazy hand to-pay-so-called-professional technicians, 
unmotivated stale heads with the approximately theory and zero practice Directors, 
uncultivated, narrow-minded communicators, just enumerating a quarter characteristic 
of these “Aliens”, were selectively chosen to lead the dream of till now 2 million people. 
Ingenious, ridiculous or erroneous…even a Shaka-Zulu reputed strategy-adept wouldn’t 
hold the waters long with this one.  
 
And if you laugh at the moment, I assure you, the Superheads don’t find this hilarious 
given the money spent.  
 
Spent…and still being spent is the money, off some off the already cited guilty and 
cannot-be-proven-innocent-hands that are unshaping the clay put at their pot-mills, 
steadily molding a scary ‘vase’/artwork that would fool nobody as to the confused state 
of mind of the molders and the inevitable weak destiny of a cracked clay pot with the 
responsibility of holding water to quench a 16 million man family’s thirst.  
 
Oh money…don’t we love the feel of the matter, always a serious matter to fools and 
wise men, poor and rich men, fast and slow men, Palestine and Jerusalem, America and 
Addis Ababa… 
 
…But the differences it brings don’t exempt the attempt to better excellence, most often 
to the expense of others; but isn’t this where the Adrenal line is drawn…oh sorry 
“adrenaline” is borne?  
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But let me surprise you…Money here is as innocent as Mandela was in 1964 and cannot 
be accused for dirtying the virgin aspirations of this baby media company.  
 
No! How could workers finger-point money when the salaries are large enough to visibly 
step-up their living standards, bigger apartments, new shoes, all-paid trips abroad, 
developing minds in our undeveloped and undeveloping country…remember our “alpha 
capital” has the wand in its hand… 
 
Question! How can it be the dough, when these bird-brained-elephants or better, puffer-
fish, carry out their jobs with a crystal-clear painful urge... 
HOW? NO! 
How can one be assigned to communicate and be deaf to one’s own inner voice; the first 
you’ll ever hear; that same one that whispers solutions, inventions, intentions and yes! 
Even prayers… 
 
Is there another way of carrying out this so many times over-coveted job, other than with 
a fiery passion and inventive commitment that we know the “sen sais” in the art to have 
e.g. the HAIC himself?  
 
I know not… 
But I know not much you would say…and I would agree pray… 
But I know and of that I am certain today… 









Obviously the money is there, even if the inspiration, or more importantly the 
technical ability, is not. 
 Certainly the Government under Paul isn't about to go without a struggle, 
to both consolidate his power and economic gain. In April of 2008, amid riots and 
death in the streets of Douala and Yaoundé, Biya amended the constitution, 
abolishing term limits and basically enabling him to remain president for life. At 
the same time, he made it illegal to be tried for crimes committed while in office. 
While his control of the media and the portrayal of the national image may have 
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irrevocably slipped, it seems as if the facade of multi-party democracy has 
disappeared as well. 
 What is left perhaps, examining the previous case studies, is a turn 
towards civil society actions, if neoliberalism has failed, and even the collapse of 
neoliberalism. As in the case of Culture Mboa, voluntary social organizations and 
institutions that form the basis of functioning society rather than force-backed 
structures of state or market have the power and potential to transform micro-
communities. It is suggested that this is a domain of social life that at once 
demands protection from, but also provides resistance to the processes of 
globalization. When media is open to critical and oppositional voices within states 
systems and without, technology can be a means of liberation as well as 
restriction, and an alternative to institutional coercion. 
Here is an opportunity for those with the skill and imagination to make use 
of new information, allowing artists, musicians and writers to be the next 
members of a new civil society. This is what I have referred to as the 
emancipatory promise of the new cargo cult, where instead of capital 
accumulation there is only ephemera—signs, sounds and images that multiply and 
intensify in unpredictable ways. Ultimately, understanding the media process and 
cargo has the ability to allow individuals to overcome the narrow vision of 
political machinery, and act as another potential cog in the civil society of 
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